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Marxist-Leninist Ideology, Soviet Foreign Policy 
and the Structure of the International System of States 
Alexandre Grichine
Abstract
This work examines the relationship between Marxist-Leninist ideology and 
Soviet foreign policy in the context of the contemporary structure of the international 
system of states. To what degree does the ideology of a state shape the course of foreign 
policy pursued by that state? How does the structure of the international system influence 
a state’s international behaviour? What happens if the ideological “foreign policy 
blueprint” comes into conflict with the requirements dictated by the structure of the 
international system?
This work will attempt to provide answers to these questions and to outline how 
structural constraints imposed on Soviet international behaviour during the 20* century 
diminished the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a determinant of Soviet foreign 
policy. It will demonstrate that, far 6om being “unorthodox" and “unique", Soviet 
foreign policy was governed by some of the same factors as were policies of other states- 
in the contemporary international system.
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Introduction
"The Soviet ideological prism reflects an image of 
the world that that is virtually unrecognizable to a 
non-communist, yet it is on this image that Soviet 
foreign policy is based."
V. Aspaturian.'
"I've done a great deal of reading on Communist 
ideology. This resulted in my understanding of the 
aims of international Communism and produced a 
steadfast American policy in meeting that threat.”
J. F. Dulles.^
“The unsubstantiated assumptions by governments 
that other governments’ behavior is strongly 
motivated by ideology (e.g. Washington assuming 
Moscow will pursue a communist foreign policy 
and Moscow assuming that Washington will pursue 
a capitalist foreign policy and both being surprised 
that neither does) has naturally led to ineffective 
foreign policies.”
W. Levi.^
From the three statements above we can see the essence of a debate going on for 
several generations among foreign policy scholars with regard to the role of ideology in 
determining the course of Soviet foreign policy. This debate is part of the larger debate 
concerning the right perspective through which a state’s international behaviour should 
be analyzed.
Many diSerent schools of thought -  Realism, Liberalism, Historical Materialism 
and others -  emphasize different approaches to the understanding of a state’s behaviour 
in the international arena. However, most foreign policy scholars can be divided into two 
basic schools or approaches. One group of scholars sees the subject mainly hom the 
perspective of decision-makers, whereas another group’s perspective emphasizes the 
environment or system in which states behave, or, in the words of Waltz, "reductionisf ’
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and "systemic" theorists/ Those who favour the first approach seek to explain state 
behaviour in terms of decision-makers and their perceptions. Many highlight the 
importance of ideological assumptions shared by statesmen for the explanation and 
prediction of the foreign policy of that state. With particular respect to the foreign policy 
of the Soviet Union, they argue that "the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism plays a 
central role,"^ because "Soviet Marxism-Leninism influences and shapes the perceptual 
and conceptual world of Soviet leaders.”® Brzezinski, for example, argues that “the 
persisting and important role of ideological assumptions in the thinking and actions of 
Soviet leaders” is "essential to an understanding of their conduct of foreign policy.” ’
On the other hand, supporters of a "system” level approach^ argue that internal 
characteristics of a state, such as ideology, do not have any significant influence on the 
foreign policy of that state. They insist that the foreign policy of a state is determined by 
the structure of the international system, which imposes a certain type of behaviour upon 
states and forces them to engage in balance of power politics.
A main consideration that served as a reason for writing this paper was an 
apparent comparability of the foreign policies of the USSR and the USA during the Cold 
War. According to scholars who support the first point of view, ideology was the factor 
behind foreign policy decisions, in both the USA and USSR cases. For example, with 
regard to the USA, they say that Lockian liberalism strongly influenced American foreign 
policy behaviour. "Strands of the linkages between the ideological traditions and foreign 
policy behaviour,” Kegley says, "may be detected in American diplomatic history from 
the Monroe Doctrine to Vietnam.”  ^ In a similar manner, Brzezinski, Ulam, Dulles, and
others argue that Marxist-Leninist ideology is the keystone to understanding Soviet 
foreign policy.
Considering that the ideologies represented by the American and the Soviet 
governments "contradicted each other in so many ways, that neither side could accept the 
ideology of the o t h e r , i t  was argued by both sides that their foreign policies were 
entirely difkrent from each other, precisely because they were based on opposite
ideological assumptions. On the other hand, others argue that the foreign policies of the 
two states during the Cold War appeared highly similar and characterized by 
expansionism and domination. This view was held not only by many foreign policy 
scholars,^^ but by a relatively unprejudiced o b se rv e r .In  short, the policies of both 
matched the general pattern of behaviour of a superpower.*^
This work will argue that the answer can be found in the Realist, particularly 
Structural Realist, approach. Without trying to dismiss the concept of ideology as a major 
motivational force behind foreign policy decisions, this work will nevertheless attempt to 
demonstrate that the constraints imposed by the structure of the international system of 
states on Soviet international behaviour significantly diminished the influence of Marxist- 
Leninist ideology on Soviet foreign policy.
The particular focus will be on the relationship between Soviet ideology and 
Soviet foreign policy within systemic constraints in the formative period of the Soviet 
state. This work will show how, during the early stages of Soviet foreign policy 
development, the influence of the structure of the international system of states caused 
certain changes in the character of Soviet leaders' perceptions of international relations, 
and transkrmed the ideologically defined goals of Soviet foreign policy in a way that
made them consistent with the Realist perspective of international relations, thus 
demonstrating that the Structural Realist approach appears to be the more elective tool in 
the explanation and analysis of Soviet foreign policy behaviour, than the "ideological" 
approach.
The main research question is thus, "Which influence on Soviet foreign policy -  
that of Marxist-Leninist ideology, or that of structural constraints -  was stronger, and, 
therefore, played a primary role in Soviet foreign policy determinationT' Such a narrow
focus, essentially “ideology vs. structure”, might well raise some objections. 
Concentrating on only two factors shaping Soviet foreign policy, this work ignores other 
factors, such as domestic influences. Due to the severely limited space, it was impossible 
to present in this work a comprehensive analysis of all factors that could influence the 
course of Soviet foreign policy. Thus, my choice was to concentrate on two factors that, 
in my opinion, were the most influential in shaping Soviet foreign policy, especially in its 
formative stage.
I would like to emphasize that the absence of the discussion of other possible 
factors of influence on Soviet foreign policy in this work should not be understood as an 
attempt to exclude these factors from Soviet foreign policy analysis. Rather, their absence 
was necessary in order to present a clear and adequate examination of the aspects I chose 
to concentrate on, namely, the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the structure of 
the international system of states on Soviet foreign policy.
This work will be divided into several chapters. The first part of Chapter 1, "The 
Concept of Ideology," wül examine the discourse on ideology with the purpose of 
deGning the concept and its functions. It will highlight that ideology can serve both as a
motivation and as a legitimization device, and that these two uses do not always coincide. 
The second part will briefly examine the Realist perspective on international relations, 
and outline the role of the influence of the structure of the international system as the 
constraining and directing force that shapes a state's international behaviour.
Chapter II will outline the main assumptions of the pre-revolutionary Marxist- 
Leninist doctrine with the purpose of determining the perceptual framework of Soviet 
leaders at the moment of formation of the Soviet state.
It will also examine the arguments of scholars who support the view of ideology 
being the main determinant of Soviet foreign policy, and highlight the inconsistency 
between the content of the doctrinal innovations made by Soviet leaders during the post­
revolutionary period and the basic pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist assumptions. This 
chapter will also suggest that the structure of the international system of states was 
responsible for changes in the Soviet leadership’s perceptions of international relations, 
changes that resulted in a fundamental shift of Soviet foreign policy and modification of 
the official doctrine.
Chapter III will examine the evolution of Soviet leaders’ perceptions of 
international relations as the direct consequence of the gradual process of adaptation of 
doctrine-based Soviet international behaviour to the requirements of the international 
system of states. It will highlight the Brest-Litovsk crisis in Soviet foreign policy as the 
crucial moment of confrontation between the requirements of Communist doctrine and 
the requirements o f the international system of states imposed on Soviet international 
behaviour. It will be shown that the new Soviet perspective that emerged during the
Brest-Litovsk foreign policy debate became very similar to the Realist perspective on 
international relations.
Chapter IV will trace the subsequent evolution of Soviet foreign policy in order to 
demonstrate the enduring character of the new Soviet perspective on international 
relations that emerged during the Brest-Litovsk crisis. More specifically, it will show that 
certain trends in Soviet foreign policy that emerged after Brest-Litovsk marked the 
beginning of a continuing pattern of Soviet international behaviour, rather than a 
temporary setback.
Chapter V will summarize the evidence presented in previous chapters. It will 
underscore the changes that Soviet perceptions went through during the initial period of 
Soviet international behaviour. It will emphasize the effect of the structural influence of 
the international system of states as the main cause of these changes. On the basis of 
these findings, it will be concluded that, despite the undisputable role of Communist 
ideology as the major motivator of Soviet foreign policy, the constraints imposed on 
Soviet international behaviour by the international system of states diminished the 
importance of Communist ideology to Soviet foreign policy analysis. Considering the 
nature of the international system of states in the 20* century, the structural Realist 
ûamework, it will be argued, presents a much more effective analytical tool for the study 
of Soviet foreign policy than Soviet official ideology.
Chapter I: The Concept of Ideology and the Realist Perspective on International 
Relations. 
Part 1: The Concept of Ideology. 
The origins of the term.
In order to examine the influence of ideology on the foreign policy of a state, it is
necessary to determine what exactly ideology is. Modem scholars view ideology as a 
historical phenomenon that emerged with the Enlightment.^'^ The word “ideology” was 
invented by Antoine Destutt de Tracy during the French Revolution. For de Tracy, 
“ideologic” referred to a new “science of ideas,” literally an “idea-ology.”^^  The term 
“was first used to refer to a philosophy whose exponents explained all ideas as deriving 
ultimately from sensations,”^^  and “attributed to ideology the power to demonstrate the 
relationship between experience and ideas, and the relationship between truth and a well- 
ordered human world.”' ’
However, the original meaning of the term has had little impact on its later usage. 
The word “ideologue” almost immediately acquired a “derogatory meaning” that “was 
attached to it by Napoleon, who dismissed ideology, equating it with doctrinaire and 
utopian ideas.”'^ This negative overtone has accompanied the term ever since, and is 
evident in works of many scholars, such as Marx,'^ Oakeshott, Arendt, Talmon, and “end 
of ideology” theorists.^"
Modem discourse
Since the 1960s, the term ideology has been revised according to the needs of 
conventional social and political analysis. Thus, “ideology” became a neutral and 
objective concept without the negative connotation once attached to it. For example,
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Plamenatz says that the term ideology, in its modem sense, "is used to refer to a set of 
closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or 
community."^^ Very close to Plamenatz's definition of ideology we can find in the 
Russian (Philosophical Dictionary, 1954 ed.): "Ideology is a
system of definite views, ideas, conceptions, and notions adhered to by some class or 
political party."^
It would be useful, in my opinion, to quote several more modem definitions of
ideology before making conclusions:
Rejai: “Political ideology is an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, action-related 
system of beliefs and values about people and society, legitimacy and authority, which is 
acquired to a large extent as a matter of faith and habit... Ideological beliefs are more or 
less coherent, more or less articulate, more or less open to new evidence and 
information.”^^
Ball; "An ideology is a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that 
explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, 
and provides a program for social and political action." '^*
Johnston: "An ideology is a more or less consistent set of beliefs about the nature 
of society in which individuals live, and about the proper role of the state in establishing 
or maintaining that society
Analyzing the discourse on ideology that was briefly examined on the pages 
above, we can easily 6nd many similarities between diSerent scholars' views on what 
ideology is. Everybody, in general, agrees that ideology is, first of aU, a "set of normative 
values and relatively enduring beliefs,''^^ which explains to its bearer how the world is.
and how it should be. It is also possible to establish that there is no "neutral," 
unprqudiced ideology. Every ideology, as can be seen, views the world hrom perspective 
of a particular group, whose interests it is meant to defend. It may be a class or may be a 
group organized on the basis of other criteria. Yakovlev for one argues: "The theoretic 
content of ideology is a sum of political, legal, moral, philosophical, aesthetical, and 
other ideas, which reflect economic relationships in a society from the perspective of a 
particular societal class.
Thus, all political ideologies describe relationships between various groups and 
individuals in the same world. However, since they all view the world from the 
perspective of particular societal groups, they differ in their evaluative content, namely 
how the world and society should be organized. In other words, it is clear that every 
ideology contains in itself a stimulus for its bearer to impose change on those aspects of 
societal structure that this ideology finds unsatisfactory. And that brings us to the main 
question examined in this work -  the relationship between ideology and political action.
Ideology and action
There is no doubt among scholars that a relationship between ideology and 
political action does exist. Brzezinski states that, "ideology is the link between theory and 
action,"^^ and everybody in general agrees that ideology is "action-related."^ But there is 
a major disagreement between scholars on the exact nature of this relationship. Most of 
them agree on the existence of a direct causal relationship between ideology and action, 
that is, that the latter is caused by the former. "Those sets of beliefs or theories that are
ideological are also overtly prescriptive; they make value judgments, and they include 
injunctions and advice to men as to how they should behave."^°
This point is supported by Eccleshall, who states that "Ideologies share two 
principal characteristics: an image of society and a political program. The image renders 
society intelligible hom a particular viewpoint. Aspects of the social world are 
accentuated and contrasted to illustrate both how the whole actually operates and ideally 
should be organized. The specific social image forms the core of each ideology. From it 
radiates a program of action: prescriptions of what ought to be done to ensure that social 
ideal and actual reality coincide. Prescriptions vary in accordance with the specific image 
of the good, or properly arranged, society.”  ^^
Yakovlev in his book “Ideology” also argues that “ideology is a system of ideas 
and theories, values and norms, ideals and directives for action, which represent interests, 
goals and tasks of a particular societal class, and aim to preserve or eliminate the existing 
social order.”^^
Skidmore shares the similar view: “A political ideology provides a program, and 
incites action.... A one-sentence definition might therefore be: ‘Political ideology is a 
form of thought that presents a pattern of complex political ideas simply and in a manner 
that inspires action to achieve certain goals.
The clearest articulation of this position can be fbimd in Donaldson's definition of 
ideology: “An ideology is a comprehensive and consistent set of beliefs and values which 
usually begins with a critique of existing reality and a statement of goals, and contains a 
program for the radical transformation of society and attainment of these goals. As such, 
ideology consists not merely of an assessment of the situation, but an impulse toward
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action, toward bringing about the desired change in the situation. An adherent of a 
[particular] ideology is provided both with a set of goals and with a distinctive way of 
looking at events... [Some] foreign policy analysts see [ideology] as a blueprint 
providing explicit guidance to foreign policy." '^*
Another group of scholars, however, disagrees with the first group and insists 
that a causal relationship between ideology and action does exist, but the former is 
influenced by the latter, that is, people adjust ideology to be in accord with their actions 
and not the other way around. For example, Balaban in his book “Politics and Ideology” 
has defined ideology as “a system of ideas and beliefs that politicians create for the 
purpose of persuading people to support or reject a given p o l i c y . I t  is, in Balaban’s 
opinion, the function of “practical thinking” to guide political action. Therefore, one does 
not need to study the ideology of an individual in order to know how this individual will 
act. “In service of his ideology,” Balaban argues, “an individual may act in different and 
even radically opposing ways -  or a particular act may be assimilated by whatever 
ideology is held by the individual.” ®^
Politics, according to Balaban, uses ideology as an argument to justify 
“eminently practical attitudes." Because the ideological rationalization of some political 
attitude or act is invariably post-facto, he says, it should not be regarded as a motivation.
“Ideology is only the form that justifies the act: it is the cosmetic 
that politicians apply to the act to make it more appealing to the public.
The word 6ees the deed. Now the act and its motivations have nothing to 
do with the ideological arguments offered up on their behalf. Ideology 
only concerns itself with the reception of its audience; politics makes use 
of the patterns of reception as a means to achieve goals other than 
explicitly stated as the content of ideology.
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The main idea that Balaban develops in the course of his work is that ideology is 
used in politics not as a guide to action but as means to manipulate social consciousness. 
Instead of being a motivational force behind a political decision, Balaban argues ideology 
is merely a tool that helps leaders carry out decisions. And he is not alone; many scholars, 
irrespective of their views on ideology, made remarks on its extreme usefulness as means 
of achieving political goals. For example, Sehger defined ideology as 'a  group of beliefs 
... designed to serve on a relatively permanent basis a group of people to justify... the 
legitimacy of the ... concerted action for the preservation, reform, destruction or 
reconstruction of a given order.”^^  Funderburk also argues that “of particular importance 
in the modem era is the role of ideologies as political belief systems that can be used to 
mobilize people for a c t i o n . Finally, Rejai adds a similar argument: “Ideologies have a 
high potential for mass mobilization, manipulation and control; in that sense, they are 
mobilized belief systems.”"^®
A simplified summary of these arguments can be presented in Figure 1 :
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Figure 1.
Flowchart of the Possible Ideological Influences on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.
Or
Justifies policy decisions
A guide to action
Does not influence 
policy decisions
Sincere^ shared by 
policy-makers
Not shared by policy­
makers
Official Ideology as a set of 
Ideas and befie6
Used to ensure mass support 
for a particular policy 
decision
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In short, 6om the discourse examined above, one conclusion could be made—that 
no matter to Wiat degree policy-makers share the official ideological beliefs, they still 
use ideology to justify policy decisions in order to manipulate the masses' consciousness 
in a way that would provide mass support for the particular policy.
The main concern of this paper is: "How important is the study of official 
ideology of a particular state to the study of the foreign policy of that state?" From the 
examination of arguments presented in this chapter, two contradictory views can be 
noted.
The first is that the study of ideology is unimportant for foreign policy analysis 
because its main role is the justification of foreign policy decisions by policy-makers who 
are motivated by other considerations. That view finds its clearest reflection in the Realist 
school of thought. The next chapter will present a brief overview of the Realist position 
in international relations.
The second view is that ideology has a crucial importance in the study of foreign 
policy because it: a) shapes policy-makers’ perceptions and values; and b) offers them a 
concrete program to act upon or, in other words, serves as a guide to action. Chapters 
three and four will consider this argument with regard to a particular state -  the USSR.
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Part 2: The Realist Perspective on International Relations 
Realism as a school of political thought.
Realism in international relations theory has its intellectual roots in the older 
political philosophy of the West and in the writings of non-Westem ancient authors such 
as Thucydides in Greece, Mencius and the Legalists in China, and Kautilya in India.
Throughout history, such prominent scholars as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hegel, among 
others, made their contributions to the development of the Realist school of political 
thought.'^'
Many prominent scholars, such as Niebuhr, Kennan, Kissinger,'*^ and 
Morgenthau, contributed to the development of the Realist school of thought in the early 
20* century. Morgenthau, who was given by other scholars such titles as “the ‘Pope’ of 
Realism in international relations”^^  and the “founding farther of International Relations 
theory,” ** made one of the most important contributions to the Realist school of thought 
in International Relations. To summarize Morgenthau’s argument briefly, “International 
politics... is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, 
power is always the immediate aim.”^^
Political Realism is, according to Keohane, based on three key assumptions that 
"furnished a usable interpretative 6amework for observers 6om Thucydides onward.” He 
articulates these assumptions as follows. "First, states are the key units of action. Second, 
they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends. Third, they behave 
in ways that are rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.”^
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Balance-of-power theory
The "balance-of-power" theory occupies a central position in realist thought. 
Morgenthau on this subject stated that 'the  aspiration for power in the part of several 
nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a
configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.” 
He viewed a balance of power as "only the particular manifestation of a general social
principle to which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the
autonomy of their component parts.”^^
In short, Moore states the main principle of the balance of power system as the
following; “If any state attempts to expand its power and influence, other states will
singly or in combination attempt to prevent this expansion."^^ “An important corollary of
the balance-of-power principle,” Moore adds, “is that any state that wishes to preserve its
power and territorial integrity must ally itself with the opponents of an expanding state...
The balance of power leads in this fashion to a system of coalitions and
countercoalitions.
According to Moore,
“Among the major skills required for success and survival under 
balance of power conditions is the ability to evaluate correctly the strength 
and weaknesses of potential allies and enemies in order to shift one's 
position in the distribution of power as rapidly and effectively as possible.
Failure to do so may lead to conquest and defeat. By the same token, it is 
often necessary for the statesman to be on guard lest an ally become too 
strong, in which case it may be necessary to shift allegiance to the 
opposite camp. In a similar way, successftil statesmen have to be skilled in 
detecting signs of dissension in the enemy's camp and in playing upon 
such conflicts to further the survival of their own state.''^"^
The balance-of-power principle, Moore highlights, also “presumes that allies have
to be sought where they may be found, and in the international arena it often occurs that
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the choice dictated by power considerations does not correspond with ideological ones or 
those of cultural afBnity."^^
The role of ideology
Under these conditions, the Realist view on the role of ideology is demonstrated 
by Morgenthau's statement that "the actor on the political scene cannot help 'playing an 
act' by concealing the true nature of his political actions behind the mask of a political
ideology.” “It is the very nature of politics,” according to Morgenthau, “to compel the 
actor on the political scene to use ideologies in order to disguise the immediate goal of 
his action,” which is always power.^^
This general point of view was also applied by Morgenthau particularly to the 
Soviet Union. The view that Soviet ideology is for the most part a rationalization of 
Soviet foreign policy, which [policy] is motivated by power considerations, can be also 
seen in works of Moore,Sharp,^"^ Daniels^^ and others.
W altz’s theory of structural influence.
The Realist position was further developed by Kenneth Waltz. In his Theory o f  
/MfemafionaZ Waltz attempted to construct a theory that would not only describe
the general pattern of states' international behaviour but would also explain what compels 
states to behave in such a way.
Criticizing earlier political scientists' attempts to explain international outcomes 
through examination of the intemal characteristics of interacting u n i t s , Wa l t z  
emphasizes the need for "systemic" theory that would deal "with the forces that are in 
play at the international, and not at the national, level." He further argued that, "to the
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extent that dynamics of a system limit the Aeedom of its units, their behaviour and the 
outcomes of their behaviour become predictable."^^
In Waltz's theory, the concept of "structure" is the most important in explanation 
of behaviours and outcomes. According to Waltz, "the concept of structure is based on a
fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting 
produce different outcomes." Structure, according to Waltz, "defines the arrangement, or
the ordering, of the parts of a system.” *^ Using the term “structure,” Waltz refers to a “set 
of constraining conditions," that “acts as a selector by rewarding some behaviours and 
punishing others."^^
Structures, according to Waltz, are defined by their ordering principles, the 
character of their units, and by the distribution of capabilities among units.^^ Waltz 
defines an international system as a “decentralized and anarchic” realm, formed and 
maintained by coactions of its units where a principle of self-help applies to the units. 
Waltz’s structure is state-centric; the main units of the international political structure are 
states that seek to ensure their survival. Speaking about the character of the units. Waltz 
defines states as “like units" that are not formally differentiated by the functions they 
perform, and that will remain like units as long as they continue to coexist in an anarchic 
realm. Since the international-political structure is anarchical, it can be defined, according 
to Waltz, simply by considering the distribution of capabilities among units: "Market 
structure is defined by counting firms; international-political structure, by counting states. 
In the counting, distinctions are made only according to capabilities."^^
The anarchical structure of the international system of states, according to Waltz, 
is responsible for the repeated patterns of state behaviours and outcomes. These
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behaviours and outcomes are closely identified with the Realpolitik approach, the 
elements of which Waltz summarizes as follows: 'the state's interest provides the spring 
of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; 
calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a
state’s interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving 
and strengthening the state.
Realpolitik outlines the methods by which foreign policy is conducted. Structural 
constraints, Waltz says, explain why states with fundamentally different intemal 
characteristics, such as ideology and social system, repeatedly use the same methods. 
Finally, the theory of balance of power explains outcomes produced by these methods.
“A properly stated balance of power theory,” Waltz says, “begins with 
assumptions about states.” “They are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own 
preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act 
for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve 
the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase 
economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and 
external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and 
shrink the opposing one).” To the assumptions of the theory Waltz adds the condition for 
its operation: “that two or more states coexist in a self-help system, one with no superior 
agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of them the 
use of whatever instruments they think wül serve their purposes.”^^  Thus, “the balance- 
of-power theory is built up fiom the assumed motivations of states and the actions that 
correspond to them. It describes the constraints that arise fi:om the system that those
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actions produce, and it indicates the expected outcome: namely, the formation of balances 
of power."^
"A self-help system," Waltz says, "is one in which those who do not help 
themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay
themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates 
states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. This theory 
requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all of the 
actors. The theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or 
fall by the wayside. Nor need it be assumed that all of the competing states are striving 
relentlessly to increase their power. The possibility that force may be used by some states 
to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to break out of the 
competitive s y s t e m . Contrary to other scholars,^^ Waltz insists that “balance-of-power 
politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be 
anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”^^
In anarchy, Waltz argues, the most important goal is the security of a state. 
Agreeing with Morgenthau on this point, he states: “Only if survival is assured can states 
safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power."^
The competition. Waltz says, affects not only military but also behavioural 
characteristics of a state. This effect, which Waltz named "socialization to the system," 
can be seen especially clearly in the example of states "conforming to common 
international practices even though for internal reasons they would prefer not to." "The 
close juxtaposition of states," Waltz argues, "promotes their sameness through the 
disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices."^^
2 0
The main prediction of balance of power theory in Waltz's interpretation is a 
"strong tendency toward balance in the system: that states will engage in balancing 
behaviour, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts." What we should 
expect is not. Waltz says, that "a balance, once achieved, will be maintained," but that "a 
balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another." Since the theory is based 
on the competitive nature of international politics, it specihcally predicts that "states will 
display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other 
and become socialized to their system.”’®
Waltz’s theory allows him to conclude that "wherever agents and agencies are 
coupled by force and competition rather than by authority and law, we expect to find such 
behaviours and outcomes."’ '
The View of Ideology from the Structural Realist Perspective.
Waltz’s main contribution to the Realist school of thought was in providing a 
rational explanation of certain characteristics of state behaviour. Moreover, emphasizing 
the structural influence of the international system as the major determinant of states’ 
international behaviour, he also somewhat changed the Realist perspective on the 
relationship between ideology and behaviour. The earlier Realist belief was that power 
considerations are the main motivation behind foreign policies, and ideology only a tool 
for rationalizing these policies. According to Waltz, however, ideology may very well be 
a foreign policy motivation. However, the existing structure of the intemational system 
influences the state to a degree, when:
a) the survival and increase in power of the state become the precondition 
for implementation of all ideologically dehned goals; and.
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b) to ensure its survival and increase in power, the behaviour of a state
(both external and internal, although the latter to a smaller degree^) has 
to match a certain pattern.
In other words, knowing the efkcts of structural influences on the behaviour of a 
state, we can draw the general pattern of the intemational behaviour of a state regardless 
of the official ideology of that state. The fundamental difkrence between Waltz and the 
earlier Realists on ideology is that Waltz does not say that ideology has no influence on 
the determination of foreign policy goals. What he says is that ideologically defined goals 
have the state’s survival and power as a precondition. And to achieve these goals, the 
state will have to behave in a manner similar to other states, because the behaviour of all 
states is determined by the structural constraints of the intemational system. In short, 
regardless of the possible role of ideology as the motivational force of foreign policy, for 
the purposes of political analysis, we can safely assume that policymakers are motivated 
by power considerations (including a state’s wish to survive), and the behaviour of a state 
will match the pattern that could be predicted by analyzing the capabilities of that state 
and the limitations imposed by the structure of intemational system on its intemational 
behaviour.
Recalling Figure 1 6om Chapter 1, it is possible to say that the general Realist 
perspective considered ideology to be unimportant for the study of foreign policy because 
it perceived ideology only as a tool of political justification. The Structural Realist 
perspective, admitting the possibility of ideology being both a motivational force of 
foreign policy and its justification, still renders it less important than the structural 
constraints of the intemational system that largely determine the state’s behaviour.
2 2
The main question finally comes down to "ideology vs. structural influence" as 
the major determinant of state behaviour, or whether it is possible for a state to build its 
intemational behaviour according to the ideological "blueprint." A very significant group 
of scholars insist that it is possible, and regard ideology as one of the major factors, or 
even the most significant factor, in determining the course of Soviet foreign policy. “To 
some Western scholars," White states, '^ e  importance of the ofhcial ideology is such 
that we are justified in regarding Soviet foreign policy as 'ideology.'"^ But, in order to 
discuss their arguments, it is necessary first to examine briefly the main ideas contained 
in Soviet ideological thought.
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Chapter II: Ideology and Foreign Policy 
Part 1: Soviet Ideology.
OfBcially, the body of Communist ideology is called "Marxism-Leninism," and 
the works of Marx (written with his collaborator Engels) and Lenin constitute the 
"classics" of Soviet ideology/^ Let us refer first to official Soviet sources on Marxism-
Leninism for a short statement about the nature of the doctrine.
Ponomarev in Political Dictionary defined Marxism-Leninism as “the science of 
laws of development of nature and of society, of the revolution of the exploited masses, 
of the victory of socialism, of the construction of communist society; the ideology of the 
working class and its Communist Party.”’®
Kuusinen, in Fundamentals o f Marxism-Leninism, develops the argument further:
“Marxism-Leninism regards the world such as it actually is, 
without adding an invented hell or paradise. It proceeds from the fact that 
all nature, including man himself, consists of matter with its different 
properties.
The Marxist-Leninist world outlook stems from science itself and 
trusts science, as long as science is not divorced from reality and practice.
It itself develops and becomes richer with the development of science.
Marxism-Leninism teaches that not only the development of 
nature, but the development of human society too, takes place in 
accordance with objective laws that are independent of man's will.
By revealing the basic laws of social development, Marxism 
raised history to the level of a genuine science capable of explaining the 
nature of every social system and the development of society 6om one 
social system to another."”
Marxism
Marxism-Leninism -  the Soviet official doctrine -  has several elements. The 
first is the canon of the doctrine, the thought of Marx and Engels, who provided many of
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the fundamental principles of Soviet ideology. The main contribution of Marx was his 
"materialist interpretation of history;" in other words, he argued that all social and 
political structures, as well as human consciousness, are formed on the basis of material 
and economic conditions of life.^^
Marx viewed history as a continuous conflict between classes generated by 
economic development. During the course of its history, Marx argued, human society 
passed through four stages of development characterized by different economic 
foundations: ancient tribal society, slave society, feudal society, and eapitalist society. 
Each stage was marked by a different mode of production, which in turn produced a 
different set of classes. For example, the feudal mode of production gave rise to two 
classes, lord and serf. The capitalist mode of production gave rise to the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat.
The central concept in Marx’s work is the concept of “private property,” which 
“gave rise to a distinction between the few who own the means of production and the 
many who work it.” The ownership of the means of production, Marx argued, enabled 
“the few to oppress and exploit the many for the sake of profit and power. In short, 
Marx insisted that the “dynamics of conflict are inherent in the nature of class society, 
and that classes are in a process of interminable conflict with each other." As he and 
Engels said in the beginning of the Co/M/Mwnüf “The history of all hitherto
existing society is the history of class struggle.
According to Marx, there was a class polarization -  an exploiting minority and the 
exploited m^ority -  in each phase of history. During each stage of the development of 
the human society, the exploitation of the lower class by the governing minority
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increased until it reached the critical point. At this point the governing class was 
overthrown by the underclass in revolutionary struggle. As a result, at the end of the each 
historical phase human society was trans&rmed into a more progressive form, as feudal 
society was transformed into capitalist society, for example. Speaking about 
contemporary capitalist society, Marx believed that capitalism was reaching a height of 
its development and would be soon transformed into a more progressive socialist 
society.^'
The important distinction made by Marx in his work is, according to Rejai, “the 
distinction between evolutionary change and revolutionary change. Evolutionary change 
takes place within each stage. Revolutionary change takes place between stages. One 
form of society cannot be transformed into another without massive u p h eav als .C lass- 
based revolutions often took violent forms. Marx argued that such revolutions were 
necessary and inevitable, because without violence -armed uprisings and wars -  it was 
impossible to overthrow the exploiting element of society.
All previous revolutions left intact the main source of oppression and exploitation 
-  private property. The capitalist stage of history, according to Marx, would end in a 
proletarian revolution that would be fundamentally different ftom all previous class- 
based revolutions. The coming proletarian revolution, Marx believed, would abolish 
private property once and for all. Since the abolition of private property would spell the 
end of the oppression and exploitation, classes and class struggle would also disappear. In 
short, "Capitalist society would be replaced by a classless society of human brotherhood, 
abundance, and peace."^
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Many international relations scholars emphasize the fact that Marx's work contains 
no systematic theory of intemational relations.^^ Nevertheless, it offers an analysis of two 
factors that are considered crucial by most foreign policy scholars. The first is the state, 
considered by many intemational relations theorists to be the main actor in international
po litics.M arx  described the state as one of the instruments that helps the bourgeoisie to 
control the proletariat, "a machine for keeping down the oppressed exploited class."^^ 
Since the coming proletarian revolution would, according to Marx's expectations, 
eliminate private property, and classes and class struggle with it, there would no longer 
be a need for a state and it would eventually disappear.
The second factor that Marx analyzed in his work was nationalism, considered by 
most intemational relations theorists to be one of the main causes of conflict between 
states.^* According to Marx, national differences and antagonisms were also destined to 
disappear after the successful proletarian revolution. As Ulam explains, in the Communist 
Manifesto, “there is an explicit statement that the materials of international politics -  
frontiers, militarism, religious differences, and the like -  are of decreasing importance. 
The progress of economy and civilization makes nationalism itself of ever dirninishing 
efkct on the destiny of peoples."^ According to Marx, nationalist conflicts were directly 
linked with capitalist exploitation. In the CoTMmwMWf he emphasized that “as
the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to 
another will come to an end." Thus, Marx and Engels rejected patriotism and national 
loyalty. “The workingmen," they said, “have no country."^
Marx replaced national loyalty with the idea of proletarian internationalism. By 
this. Nogee emphasizes, Marx “implied that the workers throughout the world had an
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identity of interest that transcended the particular nationality of which each was a part. 
The slogan 'Proletarians of the world, unite!' was a call for workers in every country to 
associate themselves politically in a common effort to overthrow bourgeois rule 
everywhere."^^ The basis for unity o f the world's proletariat was economic globalization 
created by capitalist expansion. In the increasingly interdependent world, he argued, the 
interests of both capitalists and proletariat went beyond national borders. The clear 
implication, Ulam says, "is that not only workers, but also the capitalists, 'have no 
country’, in the sense that national loyalties do not take precedence over what a given 
class in a given country conceives to be its economic interest.
"The very internationalism of the doctrine,” Ulam highlights, "is based on the 
assumption that considerations of intemational politics have become and will continue to 
be less important. If the capitalists of England and France find their trade mutually 
profitable, then no considerations of national honour, no territorial dispute will impel 
them to go to war. By the same token, socialist France and England will find no reason 
for war or rivalry: their respective working classes will realize that the fullest 
development of their internal resources is the only way to the improvement of their 
countries' economic, and general welfare. War and with it much of intemational politics 
will simply become obsolete.''^^
To summarize Marx's argument, the worsening economic conditions in the 
capitalist system and the rise of proletarian class consciousness would, he believed, 
produce proletarian revolutions in the most advanced capitalist countries, where the 
proletariat is most numerous -  Britain, the USA, Germany etc.^ These revolutions would 
then spread through the entire world and open the door to the development of a more
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progressive form of society -  a "classless" society in which "all people share the common 
tasks of providing necessities." The pinpose is to "build socialism" and "create the 
conditions for the transition to communism.
Lenin's contribution
The second main contributor to the formation of Soviet ideology was Vladimir 
Lenin, one of the most prominent Russian Marxists, the founder of the Russian 
Communist Party, and the first leader of the Soviet state, who accepted the burden of 
making Marxist theory relevant to the twentieth century and the Russian context. He tried 
to achieve this objective by using the Marxist perspective to interpret contemporary 
Russian developments and at the same time applying Marxist theory to these specific 
developments. Leninism, according to Rejai, “rests upon three articles of faith: (1) social 
reality can only be understood as classes and class conflict based on material, economic 
interests (in other words, Lenin accepted the Marxist notion that the class struggle is the 
chief driving force of historical development); (2) the only way to resolve the problem of 
class conflict is through violent revolution; (3) the only means capable of bringing about 
revolution is organization and leadership, embodied in the Communist Party."^
As we can see 6om the discussion of Marxism on the pages above, the Grst two of 
Lenin's assumptions are perfectly consistent with Marxism. The third assumption, 
however, differs from Marxism substantially. As can be seen from the above discussion, 
Marx believed that revolutions occur spontaneously; the economic and social conditions 
deteriorate until they reach a critical point, and at that moment the underclass rises on its 
own accord to overthrow the governing class in a revolutionary struggle.
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Although Marx did mention the "vanguard of proletariat" as the directing force of 
the revolution, he did not describe it in detail. According to him, this "vanguard" would 
consist of those who most thoroughly understand the nature of the class struggle and the 
necessity of revolution.^^ However, he did not perceive this "vanguard" as an outside 
force, assuming that the deteriorating conditions would create not only a revolutionary 
situation but also the revolutionary class consciousness.^
Contrary to Marx, Lenin argued that only a highly centralized party could plan 
and direct the proletarian revolution toward building socialism. He made this innovation 
in order to explain several contradictions between Marx’s prognosis and the actual trend 
of events in Europe, the most important of which were the failure of the proletariat in 
capitalist countries to develop a revolutionary class consciousness and the improvement, 
instead of deterioration, of its economic conditions.
In his famous pamphlet, What is to be done?, Lenin offered an explanation of this 
contradiction, arguing that the working class cannot develop a revolutionary class 
consciousness without a revolutionary party assuming the role of vanguard of the 
proletariat.^ "The function of the proletarian vanguard," Lenin wrote, "consists in 
training, educating, enlightening and drawing into the new life the most backward strata 
and masses of the working class and peasantry."'^ This was necessary, he believed, 
because most working people suffered from false consciousness, the most harmful form 
of which, according to Lenin, was the "trade union consciousness."^^' Lenin argued that a 
revolutionary class consciousness cannot come about spontaneously, but must instead be 
imported into the working class &om outside by a vanguard party -  "a select, highly 
disciplined, and 'theoretical’ cadre of professional revolutionaries.”"'  ^ Lenin defined a
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Communist Party as a "vanguard capable of assuming power and leading the whole 
people to socialism, of directing and organizing the new system, of being the teacher, the 
guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organizing their social life 
without the bourgeoisie."W ithout such a vanguard, Lenin insisted, the working class 
would fall under the influence of the "trade union consciousness," and, thus, would 
become a reactionary fo rce ."O rgan iza tion , leadership. Communist party," Rejai 
summarizes, “are strictly Lenin’s irmovations and virtually the defining characteristics of 
modem communism.”’®^
World War I played a major role in shaping Lenin’s views, for he saw in it the 
possibility to speed up the “revolutionary change" between the stages of societal 
development. In The Collapse o f the Second Intemational (1915) Lenin argued: “It has 
long been recognized that war, for all the horror and misery it brings, brings a greater or 
lesser benefit, unmasking and destroying a lot of what was dead and decaying in human 
institutions.’’ Later that year, he repeated this idea: “Some wars in history, for all their 
beastliness, have helped the development of mankind, have destroyed harmful and 
reactionary institutions such as absolutism or feudalism.’’ He also added that, “Engels 
realized that, for all the horrors of war, and even though one cannot guarantee that a 
particular war will bring the victory of socialism, nevertheless he said that that victory 
would come."'"^
Seeing World War I as a fortunate opportunity for an intemational revolution, 
Lenin severely criticized those who shared an anti-war position: "And objectively who 
profits by the slogan of peace? Certainly not the revolutionary proletariat. Nor the idea of 
usmg the war to speed up the collapse of capitahsm."^°^ "The idea that war could be the
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main agency to bring down capitalism," Ulam says, "was something new in Marxist 
theory. Previously, Marxism had counted on the "inherent contradictions" of capitalism, 
its inability to run the very economic system it had created, to bring about its downfall. 
Now, it was capitalism's inability to preserve an intemational order, to avoid disastrous 
wars, that aSbrded the great opportunity."^°^
Lenin, according to Ulam, drew two deductions &om this conclusion. First, 
revolutionary socialism received an opportunity to wage a revolutionary struggle by 
persuading the belligerent workers to turn their weapons not against each other, but 
against their own bourgeoisie. In other words, Lenin believed that the task of world 
proletarian revolution could be successfully accomplished by turning World War I into a 
series of civil wars in all advanced capitalist countries. “Without civil war," Lenin 
argued, “no great revolution has yet come to pass and without it no serious Marxist has 
ever imagined the transition from capitalism to socialism.”'
Second, the possibility of using the war to the socialists’ advantage diminished 
the importance of the Marxian stages of economic development. It provided a rationale 
for the occurrence of socialist revolutions in countries that, measured by Marx’s scale, 
were not developed enough to produce such revolutions. In other words, according to 
these arguments, "a world revolution might well have its starting point in Russia, even if 
the country was far behind Germany or England in economic development."' "
Lenin defended this position in TTzg CapfWwm
(1916). In this work, Lenin offered an explanation of why, contrary to Marx’s 
expectations, capitalism had not collapsed. He argued that capitalism had undergone a 
fundamental transformation that Marx could not have foreseen. The essence of this
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transformation consisted in the internationalization of capitalism; instead of remaining a 
national economic trend, capitalism became a global, intemational phenomenon. Thus, by 
"imperialism" Lenin meant "intemational capitalism."'
The central ideas of fmpgrWM/M can be summed up as follows: "(1) as Marx said,
capitalism is an economy of constant problems and crises; (2) the crises of capitalism 
necessarily lead to its internationalization; (3) the internationalization of capitalism will 
precipitate a series of wars and revolution; (4) these conflicts will spell the end of 
capitalism. Capitalism will self-destruct.”"^ That is why, speaking about imperialism as 
the “highest stage of capitalism,” Lenin meant the “most developed, the most 
sophisticated,” but also “the last, the final” form of capitalism.'"
The significance of Lenin’s concept of imperialism was threefold. First, it 
extended Marx’s critique of capitalism by giving an explanation of why capitalism did 
not collapse. Lenin agued that the focus of the most brutal capitalist exploitation shifted 
from advanced capitalist countries to the underdeveloped countries of the colonial world. 
Therefore, capitalism was able to postpone its final crisis by bribing its own workers with 
the benefits derived ftom the exploitation of the "Third World" people, and, thus, 
preventing the development of the revolutionary class consciousness among the 
proletariat."^
Second, Lenin’s concept of imperialism expanded Marx’s interpretation of history 
by introducing to his four stages of societal development a substage called "imperialism," 
a transformation Marx could not have predicted."^
Third, as could be seen from the previous discussion of Marxism, according to 
Marx, the revolutionary class consciousness is created by the deteriorating economic
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conditions and increasing capitalist exploitation. In short, the revolutionary consciousness 
appears among the people that are most exploited and deprived. Since in the age of 
imperialism the focus of capitalist exploitation shifted 6om advanced to underdeveloped 
countries, the logical assumption was that people of these countries became the "carriers 
of progressive consciousness."^In  other words, Lenin's theory revised Marx's 
conception of revolution by emphasizing the possibility of occurrence of socialist 
revolutions in underdeveloped, nonproletarian countries.” * In particular, this idea 
presented the rationale for the revolution in Russia, which “was neither capitalist, nor 
industrialized, nor even a nation in some respects in 1917.”” ^
Lenin made the following conclusions from the argument presented in Imperialism. 
First, due to the transformation of capitalism into militant imperialism, the generally 
peaceful teachings of Marx and Engels became outdated. Thus, every Marxist, according 
to Lenin, should pursue a revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie rather then 
concentrate on peaceful achievement of political power.
Second, the intemational character of 20* century capitalism indicated the 
interdependence of the capitalist countries, and their dependence on colonial and 
backward territories. Therefore, Lenin argued that a world socialist revolution could start 
in any coimtry that would happen to be the "weakest hnk" in the capitalist "chain," 
irrespective of this coimtry's level of development.
Thus, both the geographic and the social focus of the revolutionary struggle had 
to be changed. For the reasons examined above, the geographic focus of the revolutionary 
struggle had to be shifted &om advanced capitalist countries to underdeveloped countries. 
But, in most underdeveloped cotmtries, the industrial proletariat either was very weak or
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did not exist at all, and therefore was not able to carry through the socialist revoludon on 
its own. Therefore, Lenin's appealed to "all social forces, classes and groups
that for whatever reasons opposed feudalism, czarism, or imperialism."
Briefly staled, Lenin's main idea was that, contrary to Marx's expectations, the
proletarian revolutions would begin not in advanced capitalist countries, but in backward, 
underdeveloped countries where the people were most impoverished and led by a 
revolutionary party. This, according to Ulam, was “the most startling and fundamental 
revision of classical Marxism, the justification of what the Bolsheviks were to undertake 
in 1917.” '^  ^ It is also necessary to highlight that Lenin did not think that it was possible 
for a socialist revolution to survive in a backward country like Russia without the help of 
the proletariat of more advanced countries: the complete victory of the socialist
revolution in one country is inconceivable since it demands the active cooperation of at 
least several advanced countries, among which Russia cannot be counted."'^ What he 
emphasized was that such a revolution would serve as a “starting point” for the world 
proletarian revolution, and in that Lenin saw its importance.
Speaking about the ideological foundations of Soviet foreign policy, it is 
necessary to examine here a particular aspect of Lenin's theory of imperialism which 
many scholars consider to be one of the most important ideological bases of Soviet 
foreign policy: the Leninist doctrine of the "inevitability of war.” '^ ^
The doctrine of the "inevitability of war" can be divided into two subtheories. 
The hrst is the inevitability of wars between capitalist powers as long as capitalism itself 
existed. Lenin maintained that imperialist powers will be going to war against each other, 
because, "as time goes on, there is less and less to colonize. Once the division of the
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globe among the imperialist powers has been completed, capitalist countries will be 
competing -  and fighting -  over the same colonies."^^^
Another subtheory is the idea of war between socialist and capitalist states. First 
of all, as could be seen from the above discussion on Lenin saw the
revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie as the primary duty of every Marxist. He 
also believed that the socialist revolution in Russia could only survive with the support of 
similar socialist revolutions in other countries. That is vdiy the only possible course of 
action for the Russian proletariat in case of successful domestic socialist revolution was, 
according to Lenin, to “rise up against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting to itself 
the oppressed classes of other countries, provoking among them a revolt against the 
capitalists, appearing if necessary with armed force against the exploiting classes and 
their states."^^ In short, in the event of a successful revolution, Socialist Russia would 
immediately wage a revolutionary war against capitalist states.
On the other hand, from Lenin’s perspective, “the bourgeois rulers of the 
capitalist powers would regard this revolution as a direct and immediate threat to their 
class interests."^^^ In other words, capitalist states would also be forced to start an 
immediate war with Soviet Russia, because with the appearance of the first “Workers’ 
and Peasants’ State” the exploited classes in other cotmtries would, seeing this example 
and receiving all possible help from this state, put all their efforts into promotion of their 
own socialist revolutions. Therefore, the only possible option far the bourgeoisie in order 
to survive would be go to war against Russia and to wipe out the Communist government 
early in its existence while it was still weak.^^
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From this perspective, the war between socialism and capitalism seemed to be 
inevitable indeed; therefore it is no wonder that on the moment of the acquisition of 
power in Russia, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders firmly believed that a clash between 
the two social systems was unavoidable. "Intemational Imperialism," Lenin argued, 
"could not under any circumstances, on any condition, live side by side with the Soviet 
R e p u b lic ...E la b o ra tin g  this position further, he argued that "either Soviet power 
triumphs in every advanced country in the world, or the most reactionary imperialism 
triumphs... One or the other. There is no middle course.”'^’
Lenin’s Imperialism, Ulam highlights, “provided what was soon to become 
Communism with a framework of reference on intemational affairs. Imperialism has 
served as the prism through which Soviet policy-makers have viewed the outside world 
and one of the basic premises of their foreign policy.
Part 2: Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy: The arguments
In the previous section we examined basic assumptions of Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. The question is to what degree these assumptions influenced the foreign policy 
of the Soviet Union. A popular view among Soviet foreign policy scholars is that Soviet 
ideology -  Marxism-Leninism -  was the most important source of Soviet foreign policy, 
the major determinant of Soviet intemational behaviour. Among intemational relations 
scholars. White says, "there has been general agreement that the official ideology plays a 
central role in Soviet politics."^^ Brzezinski, for example, argues that "the persisting and 
important role of ideological assumptions in the thinking and actions of Soviet leaders" is 
"essential to an understanding of their conduct of foreign policy."^^^ Conceptual and
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analytical factors of Soviet ideology combined together serve, according to Brzezinski, 
'to  organize the Soviet vision of international affairs, to define goals, and to evaluate 
reality."'^ ^
The argument about the crucial role played by ideology in the determination of 
Soviet foreign policy conduct is widely accepted by many prominent scholars. For 
example, speaking about the expansionist character of Soviet foreign policy, Aspaturian
states that “expansionism is inherent in the Leninist-Stalinist i d e o l o gy .D u l l e s ,  in his 
interpretation of Soviet foreign policy, used Stalin’s book “Problems of Leninism,” 
claiming that “the actual purposes of Soviet Communism are to be judged in light of its 
official creed.”^^ * Mitchell insists that the foreign policy attitudes of the Soviet leadership 
“are not simply based on Marxist-Leninist ideas in some abstract sense -  they are soaked 
into its bones.”'^  ^Hunt argues that much of Soviet foreign policy is “only intelligible on 
the assumption that it was primarily motivated by ideological considerations.” '^^ ® The list 
is virtually endless. In this view, the crucial role was played by the official Soviet 
discourse on Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Ponomarev, for example, in the 1958 edition of Political Dictionary, under the 
entry “ideology” highlights Marxism-Leninism as the “guide to action” that leads to a 
revolutionary transformation of society:
“The ideology of the working class and its party is Marxism- 
Leninism -  the revolutionary weapon in the struggle for overthrow of the 
exploiting system and for the construction of communism.” '^*^
Other Soviet sources on Marxism-Leninism also emphasized that
“Marxist science of the laws of social development enables us not 
only to chart a correct path through the labyrinth of social contradictions, 
but to predict the course events will take, the direction of historical 
progress and the next stages of social advance. ...
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The Marxist-Leninist theory is ... a guide to aetion....
Marxist-Leninist theory provides a scientific basis for 
revolutionary policy. He who bases his policy of subjective desires 
remains either a futile dreamer or risks being thrust into the background of 
history. That is why Lenin emphasized the need for a sober scientific 
analysis of objective situation and the objective course of evolution as the 
basis for defining the political line of the Party and for subsequently 
carrying it out with all revolutionary determination."^'*^
All Soviet sources constantly claimed that the foreign policy of the Soviet state
was entirely different from its capitalist counterparts. Ponomarev, for example, presented 
the following arguments:
“Ever since those remote times when states emerged, ...foreign 
policy has always and everywhere been the weapon of the exploiting 
minority. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia... gave birth to 
a totally new foreign policy, which served not the exploiters but the working 
class, which came to power and championed the interests of the entire 
nation. This... changed the nature of foreign policy, its objectives, the 
sources of its strength and influence, and its means and methods.
Socialist foreign policy and the methods of implementing it were evolved by 
Vladimir Lenin, and as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, in 
addition to formulating the basic principles underlying this policy, he was 
the first to apply them in practice.
In the long run the policy of any state is determined by its economic 
and social system... The deep-lying distinction between the economic basis 
of socialism and that of exploiting societies gives rise to fundamental 
distinctions in foreign policy...
By virtue of its social nature, capitalist foreign policy is one of 
expansion and aggression, of preparing and starting wars of aggrandisement, 
of creating military blocks and furthering the arms race... The case is 
different with socialist foreign policy... [Wiich] harmoniously combines the 
national interest of the Soviet state and people with the internationalist 
duties of the working class, which had come to power. It combines 
patriotism and dedication to the interests of the country with 
internationalism."
In addition, the "Soviet political elite's verbal communications about the goals, 
instruments, and implementation of foreign policy"*'** also made a crucial contribution to 
the basis on which this assertion was built. *'*^ In other words foreign policy was based on 
statements of Soviet leaders, who constantly claimed to act in accordance with the
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principles of Marxism-Leninism. Tug well, for example, saw verbal communications of 
Soviet leaders as open statements about their exact intentions and the motives behind 
their actions: "The view that the Soviet Union's appearance as a great power in the 
traditional mold demonstrates any incompatibility with revolutionary intentions is 
dangerously mistaken, I think it demonstrates a dangerous reliance on violence or the 
threat of violence as the means to revolutionary ends. And it is not as though Soviet 
leaders have denied their continued commitment. ... Konstantin Chernenko, for example, 
wrote that the CPSU ‘has time and time again proved its fidelity’ to Lenin’s behest that 
the Soviet government set a higher value on the world dictatorship of the proletariat and 
the world revolution than on all national sacrifices, burdensome as they are. Or Yuri 
Andropov, who was presumably praising his then boss, Leonid Brezhnev, said in a 1982 
speech that the chairman’s name was linked ‘to the triumph of the magnificent cause: the 
victory of communism throughout the world.” From an analysis of Soviet morality, 
ideology and military power. Tug well reached the conclusion that Marxist 
internationalism was ‘‘the overriding factor in Soviet foreign and defence policy.” “I 
think,” he wrote, "that internationalism may be pushed onto the back burner hom time to 
time, but even there, it continues to brew as circumstances allow. I think that the 
apparatus of state and the might of the Soviet armed forces are servants of the party in the 
cause of world revolution. They do not indicate a change of aim, only a modernization of 
method.”
Continuity or transformation?
As proof that ideology was the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy, many 
scholars point to the "absence of any change in the doctrine of Soviet foreign policy since
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it has been fbrmulated."^^^ This view is firmly supported by Soviet sources. Izraelyan, for 
example, highlights that, during the years of the USSR's existence, "the Leninist foreign 
policy of the USSR was steady and unshakable, and that the line of the CPSU in foreign 
affairs was consistent and faithful to principles [of M arxism-Leninism]"The foreign
policy of the Soviet Union,” he emphasizes, “rests invariably on a Marxist-Leninist 
analysis of the international situation and reflects the communist ideology. Firmness and
adherence to principle in upholding the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the political 
course followed by the Soviet state... is a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy.”*'**
As a particular example of the doctrinal continuity of Soviet foreign policy, 
Edmonds cites the History o f Soviet Foreign Policy, published in 1971, which defines the 
four basic tasks of Soviet foreign policy as:
“to secure, together with the other socialist countries, favourable conditions for 
the building of socialism and communism;
- to strengthen the unity, solidarity, of the socialist countries, their friendship and 
brotherhood;
- to support the national-liberation movement and to efiect all-round cooperation 
with the young, developing countries;
- consistently to uphold the principle of peacefW coexistence of states with 
difkrent social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of 
imperialism, and to save mankind from a new world war."*'*^
Edmonds highlights that "this formulation follows word for word the resolution 
on foreign policy approved by the Twenty Third Congress of the CPSU in March 1966, 
which was repeated in turn by Leonid Brezhnev in his opening speech at the Twenty
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Fourth Congress five years later." He concludes his argument stating that the "doctrinal 
continuity of Soviet foreign policy" in the course of its history "has been remarkable."^^
However, this point of view is not as indisputable as it seems. Even Edmonds, for 
example, admits that "although Soviet foreign policy may have remained unaltered on 
paper... a gap has developed between theory and practice."'^^ Mackintosh argues even 
further that although, since the Russian Revolution in 1917, "Russian political thought 
had acquired an ideological element, now called Marxism-Leninism," this ideology "has 
passed through a number of phases, and today its links with “classical” Marxism are 
rather remote."
Evidence can also be advanced to suggest not only the existence of a gap between 
the Soviet theory and practice of foreign policy but also fundamental changes being 
introduced to the doctrine in the course of the existence of the Soviet state. The two most 
important doctrinal innovations are the idea of “socialism in one country,” which is 
recognized as the “Stalin’s most important theoretical contribution” to the official Soviet 
doctrine, and the idea of "peacefiil coexistence of states with different social systems," 
ofGcially introduced by Khrushchev.
Although the Soviet leadership claimed that both these ideas were directly based 
on the premises of M arxism -L eninism ,it is evident that both are clearly opposed to 
pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist thought, which envisaged the victory of socialism 
throughout the world and the impossibihty of the peaceful coexistence of a socialist state 
side by side with capitalist states.
However, there is no doubt that both these ideas did have their roots in Lenin’s 
th o u g h t.T h e  explanation is simple: these ideas were grounded not in pre-revolutionary
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Leninism, but in modifications to the doctrine made by Lenin in the post-revolutionary 
period.
That observation allows the hypothesis that there was a substantial difference
between the pre- and the post-revolutionary content of Communist doctrine. The 
evidence in the following chapters will suggest this hypothesis to be correct. I will 
suggest that the factor responsible for the changes in Soviet ideological thought and, 
consequently, in the foreign policy of the Soviet state, is what Waltz termed "the
structure of the intemational system of states.”’
In the next chapters, Waltz’s framework will be applied to the study of Soviet 
intemational behaviour during the formative years of the Soviet state. More specifically, 1 
will show how the perceptions of the Soviet leadership on the subject of intemational 
relations were changing as part of a process of adaptation of Soviet intemational 
behaviour to the requirements of the intemational system of states, in Waltz’s terms, 
through "sociahzation to the system.”
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Chapter HI: Changing Perspectives 
Part 1: "Revolutionary" Foreign Policy.
As discussed in Chapter II, Lenin considered the question of what would happen 
to the Russian state and to intemational politics in general in case of a successful socialist 
revolution in Russia weU before 1917.
Lenin reached the conclusion that it was practically possible for the proletariat to
carry on a successful socialist revolution in Russia and establish a “revolutionary- 
democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry”. In the eyes of Bolshevik 
leaders, the successful socialist revolution in Russia would immediately encounter active 
resistance both from the outside and from the inside. From outside, it would be 
confronted by a united front of the bourgeoisie of all advanced capitalist countries 
determined to wipe out the new socialist Russian government in order to preserve the 
capitalist system, and, thus, to retain their privileges. From inside, the Russian socialist 
revolution would encounter a desperate resistance from the members of the property- 
owning class fighting for their survival. Therefore, Lenin and other prominent Bolsheviks 
considered the defeat of the socialist revolution in Russia to be unavoidable unless “the 
European socialist proletariat should come to the assistance of the Russian proletariat."
The powerful influence of Marx's internationalist theme on the thoughts and 
actions of Russian communists could be clearly seen during World War 1. As noted 
earlier, Marx stated that “workingmen have no country;" in other words, he replaced 
“national loyalty" with the “common interest" of the intemational working class. We also 
examined Lenin's theory of imperialism, where he argued that the task of a world
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socialist revolution could be successfully accomplished by turning the "imperialist world 
war" into a series of civil wars. Thus, Marxist thought extended by Lenin's doctrine of 
imperialism provided the theoretical justiScation for the conclusion that the most 
effective course of action for the proletariat 6om the Marxist point of view during World 
War I would be to turn weapons against its own government rather than support this 
government by fighting fellow proletarians from other countries. As Lenin summarized 
this position, “A revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of 
its own government.”
Moore points out that, although “this tactical conclusion already possessed a 
theoretical basis in the general tradition of European Marxism”, only Russian Marxists, 
namely Bolsheviks, had enough faith in this tradition to base their actions on its premises. 
Thus, the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party controlled 
by the Bolsheviks issued, in September 1914, a “manifesto against the war, declaring that 
the task of socialism was to turn the conflict into a civil war. The Manifesto called upon 
socialists of each country to defeat their own bourgeoisie."^^
As to the question of what foreign policy the new Russian socialist state should 
pursue, Lenin's writings of 1915-1917, according to Moore, consistently indicate his 
support for the program of “revolutionary war." Since it was perceived that the Russian 
proletarian revolution could not survive without successful proletarian revolutions in 
other countries, especially advanced capitalist powers like Germany and England, it was 
assumed that, in case of a victorious socialist revolution in Russia, the Russian proletariat 
would immediately wage a “revolutionary war" against the rest of capitalist world in 
order to “set on fire the socialist revolution in Europe."^^^ That, so the Bolshevik
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leadership perceived, was the only course of action that wonld enable the Russian 
proletariat to retain the gains of the socialist revolution in Russia itself. As Trotsky put it, 
"If the peoples of Europe do not arise and crush imperialism, we shall be crashed -  that is 
beyond doubt. Either the Russian revolution wiU raise the whirlwind of struggle in the
west, or the capitalists of all countries will stifle our struggle.”’®
In Marxist-Leninist terms, Ulam suggests, "the Bolshevik coup of November 
could be rationalized only on the premise that the revolutionary stirrings already
perceptible in France and Germany could thereby be turned into a full-fledged 
revolution.” Time proved this assumption to be wrong, and the socialist revolution in 
Europe never materialized. Because of that, future historians often criticized the 
Bolshevik analysis of the contemporary international situation. However, this analysis 
was not as far-fetched as it might look. Considering the conditions in 1917, Ulam argues,
“There were reasons -  and not only doctrinaire -  to expect a repetition 
of the Russian November in the countries of the West. Europe was 
sickened and weary after three years of inconclusive slaughter. Severe 
mutinies had shaken the French army. There had been revolutionary 
stirrings in the German fleet, an insurrection in Ireland. The unrest among 
its nationalities was already threatening to break up the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire into fragments. Thus, not only a doctrinaire socialist but a realist 
politician might have had sound reasons for anticipating a serious 
revolutionary situation gripping Europe in the wake of the developments 
in Russia.”’®
In short, the revolutionary thought which inspired the 1917 Russian Revolution 
predicted proletarian revolution throughout the world. Most Bolshevik leaders flrmly 
believed in the inevitability of the European revolution. The appointment of Trotsky as 
Commissar for Foreign Relations and his behaviour in the office underscores this fact. 
"The choice of Trotsky, second only to Lenin in prestige among the leaders and the most 
colorful figure of the revolutionary phase,” Ulam emphasizes, could be best "rationalized
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on the grounds that the new regime did not need diplomatic relations in the old style, but 
an effective spokesman and propagandist for a world revolution."'^
Trotsky's answer to the question of what kind of diplomatic work a communist 
state could have provides an interesting perspective on the importance of traditional 
diplomacy in the eyes of Bolshevik leaders. At the time of his appointment as Commissar 
for Foreign Relations, he remarked, “I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the 
people and then close up shop.” '^ ^
As Uldricks summarizes, “there is nothing in the available sources to suggest that 
the Soviet leaders regarded this new Commissariat as a very important institution. In 
contrast, a good deal of significance was attached to the International Department of the 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets, which 
was created at about the same time to manage relations with foreign revolutionary 
movements."'^
Thus, we can clearly see the priorities of the Bolshevik leadership on the moment 
of formation of the Soviet state. Since it was widely assumed among Bolsheviks that a 
Soviet Russia was simply the beginning of the revolutionary chain reaction, and the 
imminent world proletarian revolution would soon transform the world, they regarded 
“the niceties of diplomatic procedure" as "not only inconsistent with the proletarian 
virtue of the new rulers, but simply useless."'^^
The experience of power, however, had a sobering effect on Lenin's theoretical 
analysis after he found himself the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the new Soviet republic. This experience led to the recognition by Lenin and other 
Bolsheviks that the powerful forces opposing their government could not be ignored and
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that compromises and concessions would be necessary. Recognition in turn led to a major 
change in Communist goals and to the emergence in Russia of the policy of "peaceful 
coexistence" and "socialism in one country."^^
The change of attitude toward international relations occurred during the course 
of events that led to a Russian-German peace treaty signed at Brest-Litovsk. It is 
necessary to examine in more detail this initial period of Soviet foreign policy in order to 
draw conclusions about the reasons for the fundamental changes in both the goals and 
conduct of Soviet foreign policy that occurred during this period.
Part 2: From November to Brest-Litovsk.
Immediately upon taking power on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks ran into 
harsh realities that put their doctrinal beliefs to the test. First of all, the new government 
had to resolve the war problem, which had been heavily responsible for the failure of the 
Provisional Government.
Even before Lenin came to power, the Bolsheviks used the slogan “Peace, bread, 
and land” as a means of mobilization of popular support. After achieving power, they 
inherited ftom the czarist regime a dispirited, disorganized army, a population tired of 
war, and an internal order on the edge of collapse. In this situation, the Bolshevik 
government considered that its first task in foreign policy was to take Russia out of the 
"imperialist" World War I.^^ Hence the famous "Decree on Peace" - the first act of 
foreign policy of the "provisional workers' and peasants' government," adopted by the 
second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1917, the day after the 
successful revolution.
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This first foreign policy act of the Soviet government clearly demonstrated the 
overpowering influence of Communist ideology on foreign policy behaviour and the 
perceptions of the Soviet leaders toward international relations in the early period of the 
Soviet state's existence. Eager to take Soviet Russia out of war, but Mthful to their 
ideological principles, the Bolsheviks chose the method suggested by Communist 
doctrine.
The central belief of the Soviet leadership in the early period of the Soviet state’s 
existence was that capitalist governments were inherently warlike and only the proletariat 
was capable of eliminating wars. In 1915, for example, Lenin explicitly stated that “ our 
‘peace program’... must consist of an explanation of the fact that imperialistic powers 
and the bourgeoisie cannot give a democratic peace.”’’® Therefore, the achievement of a 
stable peace was only possible with the overthrow of capitalism and the transfer of state 
authority to another class, the proletariat, in all major capitalist states.’”
Thus, although the “Decree on Peace” begins with the words “The Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Government, created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on 
the Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, calls upon all the belligerent 
peoples and t/zezr to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic
peace,””  ^ it was not formally communicated to the Allied or enemy governments, but 
was broadcast by wireless and offered to the foreign press.” '* Moreover, the document 
itself highlighted that its target audience was “the class-conscious workers of ... most 
advanced nations of mankind and the largest States participating in the present war.”” ^
In short, the “Decree on Peace,” although presented as an address to governments 
of all belligerent countries for the conclusion of a democratic peace, was in reality a
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propaganda appeal designed to encourage the masses to revolt against their own 
governments, and thus bring about an end to the war/^^
Lenin himself openly spoke about the true purpose of the document during his 
presentation of the "Decree on Peace" at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of
Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (November 8, 1917), where he highlighted the sincere 
desire for peace on the part of Soviet Russia in contrast to inherently warlike
governments of capitalist countries:
“We offer peace to the people of all the belligerent countries upon the 
basis of the Soviet terms -  no annexations, no indemnities, and the right of 
self-determination of peoples... This proposal for peace will meet with 
resistance on the part of the imperialist governments -  we don’t fool ourselves 
on that score. But we hope that revolution will soon break out in all the 
belligerent countries; that is why we address ourselves especially to the 
workers of France, England and Germany. ... The revolution of November 6^ 
and 7* has opened the era of the Social revolution... The labour movement, in 
the name of peace and Socialism, shall win, and fulfill its destiny...”'^’
A similar view was presented by Karl Radek, a prominent Polish-born Bolshevik,
five years later, when he described the aim of Soviet foreign policy as “to arouse the
popular masses in the allied countries in order that the governments, under pressure from
the masses, might sit round the table with us for peace negotiations and thus lead to a
general peace which would be more favourable to us."^^^
“While this peace appeal," according to Kennan, 'hmquestionably increased
restlessness and yearning for peace in some circles of the western labour movement, it
failed to achieve its central purpose: it produced, immediately, neither revolution nor
peace, and the authority of the other warring governments remained unshaken."^
The “Decree on Peace" also repeated the Bolsheviks’ pre-revolutionary promise
to publish the secret treaties, in which belligerent allies had agreed on the division of the
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future spoils of victory. The publication of these treaties, like the peace decree itself, was 
a direct appeal to the "peoples" of allied countries over the heads of their governments, in 
the hope that they would compel their governments to adopt the right policies. However, 
the publication of secret treaties in the Russian November 10, 1917) and
foreign press (e.g., Guurt/mn, December 12, 1917) "stirred up no great
waves of revulsion" either.
With direct appeals to the people being for most part ignored everywhere, and the 
continuing disintegration of the Russian armies, the Bolshevik government had no choice 
but to try to persuade the governments of belligerent countries to enter peace negotiations 
through traditional diplomatic channels.
On November 8, 1917, the commander-in-chief in the field, Dukhonin, received 
orders from Sovnarkom to propose to the enemy command immediate armistice 
negotiations. At the same time all allied ambassadors in Petrograd received a note from 
Trotsky that officially requested them to regard the "Decree on Peace" as a “formal 
proposal for an immediate armistice on all fronts and an immediate opening of peace 
negotiations.” ’^ '
However, this diplomatic move was strongly rejected by the Allies, to whom the 
continuation of a fight, and especially Russia's participation in it, was of primary 
importance. Thus, the Allied ambassadors in Petrograd chose to ignore the Soviet offer 
for a general armistice and subsequent negotiations for peace.
The Germans, to whom the conclusion of peace with Russia would mean that a 
substantial number of troops would become available for transfer to the western front, 
where they were badly needed, gave the only positive response.’^  Thus, Germany
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informed the Soviet Government on November 14 that it was ready to negotiate. On the 
basis of the German answer, Lenin once more asked the Allies to open peace negotiations 
together with Russia, adding that in the absence of an answer Russia would start 
negotiations on its own.^^ However, not a single Allied government showed its 
willingness to join in the move for a general cessation of hostilities. In this situation, 
Kennan highlights, "the Bolshevik government had no choice but to enter into 
independent negotiations with the Germans first, for an armistice, and then, reluctantly, 
for a separate peace.
The German-Soviet negotiations were opened on December 3 at Brest-Litovsk, a 
town near the front line between the two armies. These negotiations for the armistice, and 
later, the peace treaty, extended from December 1917 to March 1918. There were, 
according to Rosser, several phases to the negotiations, with “the Soviet position 
becoming more desperate at each stage.
The first phase covered the last part of December. The initial Soviet delegation 
was headed by Joffe, and included Kamenev, Sokolnikov, and Karakhan, all of them 
Bolsheviks of long standing. Consciously designed to illustrate the unique character of 
the new state, the delegation included, as well as military experts, a woman, worker, 
peasant, sailor, and soldier -  all of the latter brought along only for show.
In contrast, the German delegation consisted entirely of military ofBcers. Field 
Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria ofRcially headed the delegation, but the actual 
authority on the German side was exercised by the prince's chief of staff, Major General 
Max Hofbnann, one of the best strategists of the German army and an expert on 
Russia.
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The contrast between two delegations was remarkable. As Wheeler-Bennett put it, 
"The whim of history willed that the representatives of the most revolutionary regime 
ever known should sit at the same diplomatic table with representatives of the most 
reactionary military caste among all ruling classes."^^^
These negotiations are widely regarded as the "con&ontation between utopia and 
r e a l i t y , n o t  only because of the contrast between the delegations, but also because of 
equally contrasting purposes. Germany wanted to conclude peace as soon as possible in 
order to get rid of the burdens of the eastern front and to obtain much needed goods, 
especially foodstuffs. The Bolshevik side, on the other hand, “was hardly serious about 
negotiation but wanted to use the peace talks as a forum for propaganda against the war 
and the warring powers, particularly Germany.
The Soviet leaders at that time still believed revolutionary propaganda 
disseminated at the negotiations would spark the European revolution. Kamenev, for 
example, in his speech to All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the eve of the 
signing of the armistice, expressed the sincere belief that “our words will reach the 
German people over the heads of the German generals, that our words will strike h-om the 
hands of the German generals the weapon with which they fool their people..
The coming European class struggle was crucial to Bolsheviks, and detailed 
questions of geography -  who got what territory -  were of little importance. “To the 
Bolshevik mentality of that time it mattered little whether the enemy, in the form of 
capitalist imperialism, gained further sources of territorial and material strength. It was 
not upon this ground that battle was being given. The battleground was that of social 
struggle, and therein frontiers mattered little in comparison with the fight of the
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proletarian against the capitalist. It made little diHerence to them whether Lithuania was 
or was not ceded to Germany. What did matter was the struggle of the Lithuanian 
proletarian against the Lithuanian capitalist."'^
The Soviets therefore got the Germans to agree to "open" diplomacy. The 
negotiations received detailed coverage in the press of the world, and the Soviets tried 
every means to get propaganda into Germany. There also was the famous "hatemization 
proposal” -  an additional request to the German government to organize special centres 
on every sector of the front where Russian soldiers could have discussions with German 
soldiers. The Germans’ agreement to this proposal could be proclaimed by the Soviets as 
a great victory and the means of dispersion of revolutionary propaganda among the 
enemy soldiers. In addition, the Soviets soon started to disseminate copies of a Bolshevik 
newspaper published in German language and other propaganda materials within the 
German army.'^^
It is also worth noting that, despite entering formal negotiations with the German 
government, the Soviet government did not abandon its efforts to appeal to the masses 
abroad over the heads of their respective governments. The illustrative example is the 
appeal sent on November 28, 1917, by the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the 
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic to the peoples of the belligerent countries, 
asking them to join in the negotiations for an armistice. The "Appeal to All 
Mohammedan Workers in Russia and the East" on December 7,1917, the "Appeal to the 
Toiling, Oppressed, and Exhausted Peoples of Europe" on December 19, 1917, and the 
"Appeal to the Peoples and Governments of the Allied Countries" on December 29, 
1917, are illustrations of the same pattern.'^
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However, these efforts failed to produce an immediate outcome desirable to the 
Soviets: to instigate the peoples of belligerent countries either to overthrow their 
governments or at least to pressure them into concluding peace on terms favourable to the 
Soviets. This leA the Bolshevik government with only one possible tactic -  delay. The 
Soviet government still hoped that, given more time, internal revolutionary pressure 
could be brought against the German government. The task to protract negotiations was 
assigned to Trotsky, who replaced Joffe as the head of the Soviet delegation. The Soviets 
also requested the negotiations be moved to Stockholm, hoping to give their propaganda 
easier entry into Germany to facilitate Trotsky’s task. The Germans refused the request, 
however, and the second phase of the negotiations began January 9 at Brest-Litovsk.
During this phase of negotiations, Trotsky proved to be a skilful negotiator. As 
already emphasized, his main task for the moment was to prolong negotiations. Trotsky 
successfully did this for several weeks, using every excuse to protract the discussion. 
However, the game could not continue indefinitely, and on January 18 Hoffmann 
presented a map showing a blue line from Brest to the Baltic -  the future Russian border. 
This ultimatum left no room for further discussions. Trotsky had no choice but to return 
to Petrograd for instructions.
Part 3: The Brest-Litovsk Debate.
Trotsky’s return to Petrograd "opened a famous and momentous debate that 
marked the first serious crisis in relations between Soviet Russia and the outside 
world.”^^ With regard to the German terms, three alternatives were heatedly debated.
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1."Blitzrevolution."'^^ It had been previously assumed that, in the event of 
Germany insisting on unacceptable terms, the Bolsheviks would wage against it a 
"revolutionary war." As shown in Chapter 11, Lenin himself had proposed such a 
revolutionary war in 1915 in the event of the socialist success in Russia.
This view was based on the Bolshevik assumption that the victory of the Russian 
proletariat would encourage the revolution in Europe, and was further reinforced with the 
optimism resulting from the Bolshevik victory in October.
Therefore, the “left faction” of the Soviet government, a bare majority headed by 
Bukharin, argued for a revolutionary war against European capitalism. The full 
realization of Russia’s military weakness was, according to Taracouzio, “overbalanced by 
the unmarred belief in the power of fraternization on the front lines: They were certain 
that the German soldier would refuse to fight when he confronted with an appeal to class 
solidarity with his Russian brothers who were laying down arms."^^ To the supporters of 
this view, the only way of gaining the true objective of Marx was the proletarian victory 
over Imperial Germany and its allies. A peace separately concluded by Russia with 
Germany would, in the opinion of the Bukharin faction, ruin both the Russian and world 
revolutioru5.^°  ^ The group also argued that "the proletarians of Europe deserved the first 
allegiance of the Soviets; a separate peace to save the skin of the Soviet regime would be 
a disgusting betrayal of communist ideals."^°^
2. A modirication of the extreme position of the left-wing communists was 
introduced by Trotsky, who believed that the Germans would not dare to advance into 
Russia. Subscribing to a general idea of worldwide Blitzrevolution, and believing, like 
Bukharin, that the immediate interests of the Russian revolution must be sacriGced to
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those of world revolution, Trotsky did not consider the survival of the proletarian 
authority in Russia essential for the eventual triumph of world communism. He 
proclaimed his "neither peace nor war" formula according to which Russia would not 
sign a treaty but would stop fighting and demobilize. This would give, according to 
Trotsky, convincing proof to the European proletariat of the basic hostility between the 
Soviets and the Germans and, thus, would stop the persistent rumours the Bolsheviks 
were German agents. It might also instigate the European revolution. Trotsky wrote to 
Lenin: “My plan is this: We announce the termination of war and demobilization without 
signing any peace. We declare we cannot participate in the brigands’ peace ... after we 
declare the war ended ... it would be very difficult for Germany to attack us, because of 
her internal conditions.” °^^  Trotsky’s point of view was widely supported among the 
Bolshevik leaders. Kamenev, for instance, optimistically spoke at that time, “There is no 
doubt that, if Germany dares now to lead her armies against revolutionary Russia, this ... 
will be the spark which in the end will cause the explosion and finally sweep away the 
whole edifice of German imperialism. We are convinced that Germany will not dare to 
make such an attempt, since, if that happens, we shall all the same, notwithstanding all 
obstacles, obtain peace in the end, though we shall then be conducting negotiations not 
with the representatives of German imperialism, but with the socialists whose efforts will 
overthrow the German govemment."^^
3. "Peace at any cost." In a sharp opposition to Bukharin and Trotsky, Lenin 
insisted on the acceptance of German demands and signing a separate peace with 
Germany. "Under the circumstances," Taracouzio emphasizes, Lenin "did not see any
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possibility for Russia to go on with the war against Germany. Nor did he share Trotsky's 
illusions in regard to the timidity of the German armies."^*^
To Lenin it was evident that Soviet appeals to the masses had had no substantial 
effect abroad. He also believed a continuation of the war with Germany, Wiich was 
infinitely superior in military terms than Russia at the time, would be suicidal. This 
course of action would not only lead to the dismemberment of Russia but would also 
destroy the newly established communist regime, which was to serve as an inspiration for 
the proletariat abroad. The only possibility of avoiding this outcome was, according to 
Lenin, “to limit their [Bolsheviks’] designs for peace to Russia alone,” that is, to end the 
war between Russia and the Central Powers at any cost.^^
In his Theses on the Question o f the Immediate Conclusion o f a Separate and 
Annexationist Peace, Rubinstein says, “Lenin argued, with force and clarity, that the 
preservation of the revolution in Russia must outweigh the more uncertain prospects of 
world revolution: that at least for the immediate future, the interests of the international 
proletariat must be subordinated; and, indeed, the best way to ensure the eventual success 
of the world socialist revolution was first to safeguard the revolution in Russia:” ®^^
“The international situation ... precludes any possibility of predicting 
the time of the outbreak of revolutions and the overthrow of the imperialistic 
governments of Europe (including the German Government)... It is 
impossible to make such predictions, and every atterrit to do so is a blind 
gamble... Under the circumstances it would be a very bad policy to risk the 
fate of the Socialist Revolution on the chance that a revolution might break 
out in Germany by a certain date... Our tactics must be based ... solely on 
the question of safeguarding the Socialist Revolution in one country until the 
others are ready to join..
Although Lenin regarded the interests of the Soviet state and the world revolution
as identical, and, like other Bolsheviks, thought that one could not survive without the
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other, he argued that the peace of Brest-Litovsk would help rather than hinder the world 
revolution: "[The] Soviet Socialist Republic in Russia will be a model for all other 
peoples and excellent material for propaganda purposes...." Therefore, he continued, 
"every... revolutionary... will admit that we were right in signing any disgraceful peace, 
because it is in the interests of the proletarian revolution and the regeneration of 
Russia."^°^
“For the time being," Lenin insisted, "we cannot make [revolutionary war] our 
object. Our socialist republic has done and is doing everything possible to give real self- 
determination to Finland, to Ukraine, etc. But if the concrete circumstances are such that 
the safety of the Socialist Republic is being endangered ..., there is no question that the 
interests of the Socialist republic must predominate.
Displaying a sharp sense of political realism, “Lenin preferred to see the original 
triumph suffer a humiliating setback rather than have it ultimately nullified by blind 
enthusiasm. He argued that the need of the moment was not an aggressive proletarian 
revolutionary war hut revolutionary defence of the country of the proletarian 
dictatorship.”^'' To negotiate a peace was the best way to meet this need. The German 
terms, Lenin insisted, must be immediately accepted.
Lenin was able to persuade only 15 out of 63 party leaders to support his position. 
Sensing the mood, Lenin switched his support to Trotsky's proposal, although he was 
sure that this alternative would fail, and Russia could lose even more territory in case of a 
German advance. But he was not ready to risk splitting the party. "We will only risk 
losing Estonia or Latvia, and for the sake of a good peace with Trotsky," Lenin said with 
sarcasm, "Latvia and Estonia are worth losing."^'^ Thus Trotsky's motion "to stop the
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war, not to conclude peace, to demobilize the army" was passed at a Central Committee 
meeting on January 24, 1918. The only formal motion proposed by Lenin was the 
instruction to protract the negotiations as long as possible, which was also approved.^ 
With these instructions, Trotsky departed for Brest-Litovsk on January 28, 1918. The 
third phase of negotiations started on January 30,1918.^^^
The negotiations continued for several days, and might have continued 
indefinitely, but the eventual outcome was clear, and Trotsky was waiting for the 
convenient moment to declare his famous formula for “neither war nor peace.” The 
convenient moment came on February 8, when the Germans signed a separate treaty with 
the Ukrainian Rada. Expecting a forthcoming German ultimatum, Trotsky decided that 
the time had come to deliver his formula. On February 10, Trotsky declared that “Russia, 
while refusing to sign an annexationist peace, for her part declares the state of war with 
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at an end.”^^  ^ When asked for a 
clarification, Trotsky refused to negotiate further. He added only that he was “deeply 
convinced that the nations of Germany and Austria-Hungary would not allow their armies 
to advance.”  ^ The Soviet delegates left Brest-Litovsk for Petrograd the same evening.
Trotsky's formula proved futile. On February 16 the German High Command 
announced that the war would resume in two days. On February 18 German troops began 
a rapid advance in the direction of Petrograd. Only at this moment, Taracouzio 
emphasizes, were many of the Bolshevik leaders finally forced to realize that neither the 
policies of the extreme leftists nor of Trotsky were sensible: "The continuation of the war 
no longer promised the defeat of Germany, advocated by the former [leftists], and the 
German High Command did not see 6t to accept the cataclysmal status of 'no war, no
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peace' proposed by Trotsky."^'^ In the face of German advances, Lenin finally received 
by a bare m^ority an authorization to ask the Germans for a conclusion of peace?^^
On February 23, the new, considerably harsher, German terms arrived. The battle
in the Central Committee was resumed on the same day. Trotsky once again stated his 
objections, that to accept peace meant "to lose support among the leading elements of the 
p ro le ta r ia t .B ukhar in  and some of bis supporters still wanted a revolutionary war. In 
this situation, Lenin declared his own ultimatum, promising to resign unless the German 
ultimatum was immediately accepted. After hours of debate, Lenin finally won.^^^
On the same evening the same proposal came before Central Executive 
Committee of the Congress of Soviets. In the face of a strong criticism and accusations of 
“compromising with imperialism,” Lenin delivered an effective speech, arguing that “this 
shameful peace” must be signed “in order to save the World revolution, in order to hold 
fast to its most important, and at present, its only foothold -  the Soviet Republic.” The 
motion was passed. A telegram was sent indicating the German demands would be 
accepted. Chicherin -  a future head of the Commissariat of International Affairs -  headed 
the delegation this time: according to Carr, neither Trotsky nor Joffe wanted to face the 
humiliation. The Soviet delegation left for Brest-Litovsk on February 24 with instructions 
to "sign without argument or discussion.”^
On March 3,1918, Soviet representatives signed the peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, 
"a shameful peace,” as Lenin put it, that stripped Russia of one-third of its population and 
most of the territories acquired during the last three centuries of expansion. However, the 
formalities of ratification had still to be approved and carried out in Moscow. The 
seventh party congress (March 6, 1918) repeated the old arguments on both sides. Lenin
61
again used cold logic and stated the compelling reasons for signing: "Our country is a 
peasant country, disorganized by war... We have no army, and here we have to exist 
alongside a robber country armed to the teeth... The world revolution will not come as 
speedily as we expected."^ Lenin argued that "the 'triumphal procession' of the first 
weeks of the revolution was over, and it was time to face harsh realities by arming and 
working." After a long debate, the motion to ratify the treaty was passed. The debate was
o v er.^
P art 4: The Transformation of Soviet Perceptions
“For the Bolshevik regime,” Rubinstein notes, “the Brest-Litovsk crisis served as 
a crucible from which emerged the outlines of a foreign policy.
Before 1917, most Bolsheviks sincerely believed that, after the success of the 
socialist Revolution in Russia, similar revolutions in other capitalist countries would 
quickly follow. In this case, “proletarian Russia would be surrounded by class allies who 
had wrested power from the bourgeoisie; frontiers and state sovereignty would lose their 
meaning, and class solidarity would override national differences as old political entities 
became caught up in revolutionary change."^^ The security problem, therefore, would no 
longer present itself in its traditional form. Traditional international relations, and the 
balance of power politics that every state had to pursue in a potentially hostile 
international environment, would be replaced by principles of "proletarian 
internationalism, friendship and brotherly co-operation between peoples" as a guide in 
mutual relations between socialist countries.^^
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Since the survival of the Russian Revolution and the implementation of its goals 
were considered dependent on revolutions occurring in other countries, the early 
Bolsheviks defined the main objective of Soviet foreign policy as to promote such 
revolutions and help to sustain them. There&re, instead of being confined within the 
borders o f the old Russian state, security became "consciously and deliberately 
contingent on events well beyond those territorial conhnes."^ Shortly after the October 
revolution, Lenin said to his friends; “From now on Russia will be the first state in which 
a Socialist order has been established... I have another surprise coming . . . I t  isn’t a 
question of Russia at all, gentlemen. I spit on Russia... This is merely one phase through 
which we must pass on the way to a world revolution.
In other words, the pre-revolutionary and the early revolutionary Communist 
doctrine, which served as the main basis of the early Soviet foreign policy, “emphasized 
horizontal or class cleavages, to the neglect of vertical or national cleavages.
However, events developed quite differently than expected by the Bolsheviks 
before the October revolution. During the course of events leading to the signing of the 
Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, it became clear that the capacity of the Russian 
revolutionaries to affect events beyond the borders of the country was highly limited, and 
the revolutionary potential of the Western masses grossly overestimated. Despite all 
Soviet efforts,^ ^ the world revolution failed to occur.
The Communist leaders of the Soviet state had to adapt to the fact that their 
earlier definitions of the conditions for survival and of how to ensure it “were based on a 
situation which clearly no longer existed"^^ and, therefore, were no longer relevant. 
They also became convinced that, for the hope of eventual widespread revolution to
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survive, the Soviet state itself had to be preserved. If socialism in Russia were to fail, 
then, as many Bolshevik leaders, including Stalin, emphasized, the cause of the world 
revolution would be lost. The creation of a strong and unassailable Soviet state, on the 
other hand, would help to promote international revolutionary movements much more
easily and effectively. Therefore, the underlying principle of the new tactics adopted by 
the Bolsheviks during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations became "how can the socialist 
revolution most faithfully and reliably ensure the possibility of strengthening itself, or, at 
least, maintaining itself in one country until it is joined by other countries."^^ “The 
Soviet government,” Carr emphasizes, thus “found itself almost involuntarily in the 
posture of defending, not the interests of world revolution, but national interests which 
any government of Russia would be obliged to defend."^^
The foreign policy failures suffered by the Soviet government during the early 
period of the Soviet state’s existence forced Lenin and the Bolsheviks to realize that “to 
persist in the pursuit of world revolution would be suicidal and, therefore, coexistence 
with the capitalist enemies was a condition of survival.”^^  ^This realization encouraged an 
interest by the Bolshevik government in balance-of-power diplomacy, and an extended 
coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist states.^^
The Brest-Litovsk debate brought an end to the "dogmatic absolutism, which 
assumed that the Soviet regime must maintain an attitude of equal and unqualiried 
hostility to all capitalist governments and objected on this ground even to the conclusion 
of a separate peace."^^ The Bolshevik leaders realized that it was the division in the 
capitalist world that "had enabled the Soviet government to establish itself and was the 
best insurance for its survival."^^ As Radek wrote in 1921, it was the "fundamental fact"
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which "stood at the cradle" of Soviet foreign policy. Lenin recognized the value of 
divisions in the capitalist camp in his "Twenty-one Theses for Peace":
"By concluding a separate peace, we are freeing ourselves in the 
largest measure possible at the present moment &om both warring 
imperialist groups; by utilizing their mutual enmity we utilize the war, 
which makes a bargain between them against us difficult.
"From this recognition of the pragmatic value of the division m the enemy camp,"
Carr says, “it was only a short step to the conscious exploitation of it as an asset of Soviet 
foreign policy, and to the abandonment of any doctrinal assumptions of the uniform and 
unvarying hostility of the capitalist world.” '^^ ° Lenin’s statement during his interview with 
Lockhart, an unofficial representative of the British government, on March 1, 1918, 
before the actual signature at Brest-Litovsk, at a moment when German armies were still 
advancing on Petrograd, confirms this point:
“We can afford to compromise temporarily with capital. It is even 
necessary, for, if capital were to unite, we should be crashed at this stage 
of our development... So long as the German danger exists, I am prepared 
to risk cooperation with the allies, which should be temporarily 
advantageous to both of us. In the event of German aggression I am even 
willing to accept military support..
Chicherin, the head of International Affairs Commissariat, in his speech at the 
Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1918) also stressed that success of the policy of 
"waiting, manoeuvring" conducted by the Soviet state in order to "avoid dangers 
threatening its destruction" was due to the proper use by Soviet leadership of "the conflict 
of interests not only between the two coalitions [of capitalist states], but also within each 
of them."^^^
In short, although Soviet leaders continued to perceive the world revolution as the 
ultimate security, they now considered Soviet national security essential for the eventual
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success of world revolution?'*^ They also realized that the only reliable and effective 
means to protect the Soviet state -  "the citadel of revolution" -  was to use traditional 
balance-of-power politics. Lenin later summarized this idea in his statement:
“Fundamental . . . is  the rule which we have not only theoretically 
learned but have practically applied and which shall remain a fundamental 
rule for a long time, until the final victory of socialism in the whole world; 
this is the rule that we must exploit the contradictions and divergences of
views between two imperialisms, between two groups of capitalist states, 
pushing one against the other.... If we have not abided by this rule, we all 
should have hanged a long time ago on the trees to the satisfaction of the 
capitalists.” "^**
To summarize the argument in one sentence, the Bolsheviks started the Brest- 
Litovsk negotiations with the goal of promoting world revolution and destroying the 
existing international system of states; they ended them with the goal of ensuring 
Russia’s survival in this system.
Part 5: Acquiring Necessary Attributes
In the international system of states, the Soviet state could only survive under 
certain conditions.
First, it had to create the means for its own military defence. Any breathing space 
granted to the Bolsheviks, Lenin argued during the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk 
treaty, had to be used for creating an army. "Learn to be disciplined, to introduce severe 
discipline; otherwise you wiU be under the German heel, just as you are under it now, just 
as unavoidably you will continue to be until the nation leams to fight, until it will have 
created an army which will not run away, but will be capable of enduring the most 
extreme hardships." '^*^ During the autumn and winter of 1918-19 a Red Army was
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conscripted, trained, and tried in battle. During the crucial 1918-1920 period for the 
Soviet state, this army proved itself as an effective instrument of military defence.^'^
Second, contrary to Lenin's original revolutionary concept of superseding the 
bourgeois state with new institutions (the Soviets), Soviet Russia had to create a strong 
government apparatus. Such a government apparatus was, according to KrippendorfT, 
'the  result o f an externally imposed compulsion to survive."^^ There is compelling 
evidence that a large proportion of officials in the “central apparatus” of the early Soviet 
government and the Red Army consisted of veterans of the old, “bourgeois” regime, 
which the Communists were determined to destroy. Lenin himself complained in 1923: 
“ . ..our state apparatus is to a considerable extent a survival of the past and has undergone 
hardly any serious change. It has only been slightly touched up on the surface, but in all 
other respects it is a most typical relic of our old state machine.
Third, the economy had to be made to function, and the enormous lead which 
European capitalist industrial countries had over Soviet Russia in the development of 
productive forces had to be reduced, as quickly as possible. The early Soviet leaders not 
only did not want to separate Soviet Russia from the capitalist world market, they tried to 
integrate Russian economy into the capitalist world economy as far as possible. They 
considered Russia's raw materials as the major factor facilitating the economic 
integration of Russia into the world market. Lenin argued: “For the world economy to be 
restored, Russian raw materials must be utilized. You cannot get along without them -  
that is economically true. It is admitted even by ... a student of economics who regards 
things 6om a purely bourgeois standpoint. That man is Keynes.''^^
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Lenin, Rykov and the others considered the acquisition of foreign capital, 
technology and professional skills by means of exporting raw materials and guaranteeing 
concessions to capitalist enterprises in Soviet Russia to be of prime importance for the 
recovery of Soviet Russia's economy.^°
This shift in the Soviet leadership's view on the possibility and desirability of 
economic relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist powers was already evident 
by the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. At that time, Lenin himself “emphasized 
that there was no reason why a socialist state could not do business indefinitely with 
capitalist states.
Finally, and most importantly, the Soviet state could not survive without 
establishing traditional diplomatic relations with other capitalist states. Immediately after 
coming to power Bolshevik leaders were predisposed to regard “the traditional methods 
of international law and diplomacy as alien to a proletarian s t a t e . T h e y  argued that the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the capitalist states was a “direct violation of 
socialist principles and ideals: no matter now noble the ends, certain means were 
automatically excluded on grounds of principle."^^^ Trotsky, for instance, made the 
following remark: "For us there can be no allies jftom the imperialist camp. The 
revolutionary camp of the proletarians, advancing in an open battle with imperialism -  
these are our allies."^^
Nevertheless, after the repeated failures of revolutionary tactics, and facing the 
possible destruction of the Soviet regime by the German army in February 1918, Trotsky 
was the first to propose that the Bolsheviks should ask the Allies for aid against 
Germany. Lenin also supported this decision, saying, "Please add my vote in favour of
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taking potatoes and ammunition from the Anglo-French imperialist robbers."^^^ And even 
after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed but not yet ratified, Lenin, Trotsky, and many 
other Bolshevik leaders "stiU hoped, through Allied help, to risk rejection of [this] 
treaty."^^
In August 1918, when the Whites and the Allies were pressing upon the 
Bolsheviks, Chicherin asked the Germans for aid against Allied intervention?^^ At that
time, Marantz highlights, “Lenin went so far as to declare that under appropriate 
circumstances even a military alliance with imperialist governments would be 
a c c e p t a b l e . “We have often said,” noted Lenin, “that an alliance with one imperialist 
state against another to consolidate the socialist republic is not objectionable in the point 
of principle.
In other words, the failures of revolutionary policy in the early period of the 
existence of the Soviet state forced the Soviet leadership to adopt traditional balance-of- 
power methods, which assume that “allies have to be sought where they may be found, 
and that the choice dictated by power considerations does not necessarily correspond with 
ideological ones or those of cultural affinity.”^^ From Brest-Litovsk on, the Soviet 
government began to rely increasingly on traditional balance of power politics. In the 
development of the Commissariat for Foreign Relations itself, there was the marked shift 
6om amateurism to pro&ssionalism.^^ Moreover, many scholars insist that all m^or 
Soviet foreign policy successes and even the survival of the Soviet state itself during its 
formative years were clearly attributable to the Soviet pursuit of traditional balance-of- 
power diplomacy
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Part 6: The ModiGcation of the Official Doctrine
It is clear that external efforts to preserve the Soviet state taken by the Bolsheviks 
in the early period of the Soviet state's existence required cooperation, or at least 
peaceful coexistence, with some or all c^italist states. These foreign policy efforts were 
therefore in fundamental contradiction with pre-revolutionary Communist doctrine, 
which assumed that the Soviet state must "maintain an attitude of equal and unqualiGed 
hostility to all capitalist governments."^^ The alternative was "revolutionary war," which 
Soviet Russia clearly could not fight without support from the proletariat of advanced 
capitalist countries, and for which no significant support was forthcoming. Thus, the 
doctrine itself had to be modified according to the existing conditions.
A brief comparison of the re-evaluation of official Soviet views on the "world 
revolution” and “peaceful coexistence” using Lenin’s public statements will help to 
demonstrate this point clearly. (See Table 1)
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Table 1.
Lenin's Public Statenments 1918-1921:
The Reflection of Changing Soviet OfGcial Views.
World revolution Peaceful coexistence
“The socialist revolution 
in one country is 
inconceivable. The task 
is to gain time until the
second socialist
revolution, world-wide 
in scope, will arrive."^^
1918-19.
“It is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to 
exist alongside of the imperialist states for any 
length of time. One or the other must triumph in
the end. And before that end comes, a series of 
frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic 
and the bourgeois states is inevitable.”^^ ^
“The world socialist 
revolution is being 
delayed.
1920.
5î 266
“Without having gained an international victory, 
which we consider the only sure victory, we are 
in a position of having won conditions enabling 
us to exist side by side with capitalist powers, 
who are now compelled to enter into trade 
relations with us. In the course of this struggle 
we have won the right to an independent 
existence.... It will be clear that we have 
something more than a breathing-space; we have 
entered a new period, in which we have won the 
right to our fundamental international existence 
in the network of capitalist states.... Today we 
can speak, not merely of a breathing-space, but 
of a real chance of a new and lengthy period of 
development. Until now we had actually no basis 
in the international sense.5^267
May: “We have made 
the start. When, at what 
day and time, and the 
proletarians of which 
nation will complete this 
process is not 
important... the ice has 
been broken; the road 
open, the way has been 
shown."^^
December: “1 do not 
know whether this is for 
long, and I do not think 
that anyone can 
know."^^
1921.
“Is the existence of a socialist republic within 
capitalist encirclement at all conceivable? It 
seemed inconceivable &om the political and 
military aspects. That it is possible both 
politically and militarily has now been proved; it 
is a fact."^^°
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From Table 1 we can see a clear trend: as time passed, and the prospect of the 
world revolution became more uncertain, the more acceptable the concept of the peaceful 
coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist states became. In other words, we can 
observe the process of the adaptation of the doctrine to external realities over a three-year
period.
Thus, the new perspective on international relations that was adopted by the 
Soviet leaders during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and developed further during the 
formative period of the Soviet state was fundamentally different from the Communist 
pre-revolutionary perspective on international relations on which Bolsheviks based their 
international behaviour immediately after they came to power. This new perspective was 
due to external circumstances over which the Soviet leaders had no control.
Part 7: The New Soviet Perspective on International Relations
Let us briefly summarize the new Soviet views on international relations. The first 
crucial change in the Bolshevik perspective was to recognize the interests of the 
revolution and of the Russian state as essentially the same. They could be absolutely 
sincere stating: "We do not defend ... national interests; we declare that the interests of 
socialism, the interests of world socialism are higher than national interests."^^^ 
Nevertheless, recognizing the Russian socialist state as the "socialist fatherland," and its 
defence as the defence of world socialism, Soviet leaders formulated the basic task of 
their foreign policy as "to ensure the possibility of strengthening the revolution, or, at 
least, maintaining it, in one country."^^ Simultaneously, Soviet Russia was increasingly
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viewed as a state that: a) recognized itself as such; b) wished to survive; and c) wished to 
increase its power.
As Soviet Russia adopted these Realist perceptions and objectives, it also became 
subject to the structural influences of the international system of states. The
transformation of Soviet Russia’s international behaviour starting with Brest-Litovsk is 
totally consistent with the Realist picture of international politics drawn by Waltz, which 
was examined in Chapter 1. The structure of the international system determines the kind 
of state-player likely to prosper. The successful player, in order to be such, has to possess 
certain attributes, such as a strong government and an army capable of its military 
defence. In order to survive, the Soviet state had to acquire these attributes no matter how 
inconsistent they were with Marxist doctrine.
The structure of the international system acts as a selector not only with regard to 
the attributes of its players. It also encourages certain behaviours and penalizes those who 
do not behave in prescribed ways. In other words, it constrains players from some actions 
and disposes them toward others. That is exactly what the Bolshevik leaders found out 
when they first entered the international scene. They discovered that their unorthodox 
revolutionary policy was not likely to bring them any substantial benefits; moreover, it 
was likely to impose on them great costs and increase the hostility of other states toward 
the new regime. At the same time, commonly accepted balance-of-power diplomacy, 
however distasteful it was to Bolsheviks, was their best chance to survive.
In other words, after recognizing itself as a state wishing to maintain its existence, 
Soviet Russia faced a particular task -  to survive in the anarchical international system of 
states, the main principle of which is that of a self-help. In order to maintain its security,
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it had to rely, as other states did, on the means it could generate and the arrangements it 
could make for itself. The main task it faced was to lessen the extent of its vulnerability 
to external aggression and economic dependency on other states; in other words, to
become as internally strong and self-sufficient as possible.
Soviet Russia achieved this aim by a combination of internal and external efforts. 
Internally, its eftbrts were focused on the creating a strong government apparatus, 
increasing military strength and expanding economic capability.
Externally, there was an important shift from a revolutionary foreign policy to a 
balance of power diplomacy focused on accommodating its adversaries, where necessary, 
and acquiring allies in order to balance the power of its enemies.
In short, the Soviet state soon performed much the same tasks as other states, and 
in much the same fashion. In order to survive and prosper in the international system of 
states, Soviet Russia had to transform itself with the effect that the new Russian state 
came closely to resemble other states in the international system in terms of its external 
relations. It is necessary to emphasize that the personal views and values of Bolshevik 
leaders had no influence on this transformation. According to Marantz, Lenin himself 
openly admitted in 1920 that “the situation that had developed during the first years of 
the Soviet state's existence was not at all what he had anticipated earlier." “It is very 
strange for those of us who have lived through the revolution from its inception, who 
have experienced and observed our incredible difBculties in breaching the imperialist 
fronts, to see how things have now developed. At that time probably none of us expected 
or could have expected that the situation would turn out as it did."^^^
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In short, it is clear that Soviet Russia emerged from the Brest-Litovsk 
negotiations as a nation-state with the main goal of its foreign policy defined in terms of 
its national survival and national power. The conduct of this redefined foreign policy was 
based on a balance of power diplomacy as the most reliable and effective means to 
achieve goals defined in terms of Soviet national power given the existing structure of the 
international system of states.
There is much evidence to confirm that this shift 6om  the goal of world 
revolution and revolutionary methods of foreign policy to the goal of national interest and 
traditional balance of power diplomacy was not a temporary t a c t i c , b u t  the beginning 
of a continuing pattern of Soviet behaviour in international affairs. A brief general review 
in Chapter IV of the development of Soviet foreign policy during the Soviet Union’s 
existence will help to demonstrate this point.
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Chapter IV: Continuing pattern of international behaviour 
Part 1: Leninist Foreign Policy
From Brest-Litovsk on, the Soviet Union began to rely on traditional balance-of- 
power diplomacy, the key tactic of which was the exploitation of diSerences between 
capitalist countries in order to prevent them 6om farming a united front against Soviet 
Russia. The frs t large-scale triumph won by the Soviets through the techniques of 
balance-of-power diplomacy was the detachment of Germany from a position of 
dependence on England and France by the “Rapallo Treaty” of April 16, 1922.
According to Kennan, the Rapallo pact gave to the Germans flexibility in policy 
toward the victorious states that they did not have before. For the Soviets, this treaty 
established a “useful precedent for diplomatic recognition by other great powers.” It 
decisively “detached Germany from the ranks of those pressing the Soviet government 
for payment of the debts of previous Russian governments and for compensation for the 
foreign property nationalized in the Russian revolution.” Finally, it “disrupted every 
possibility of a united fo n t of the European powers in their economic dealings with 
Russia at the moment of maximum Russian economic weakness.”^^  ^As Chicherin said, 
this treaty signified that “if  Britain forms a united fo n t against the USSR, Germany will 
not join such a coalition.”^^ ^
During the 1920s, the Soviets continued successfully to exploit the diplomatic 
struggle among England, France and Germany, using every opportunity to prevent 
capitalist unity toward Russia. An illustrafve example is the “Berlin Treaty," which was 
concluded between Russia and Germany on April 24, 1926 and repeated the essentials of
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the Treaty of Rapallo. The Berlin Treaty, according to Kennan, "was a neutrality pact, 
specihcally reaflirming the Rapallo relationship, providing for neutrality if either party 
should be attacked by a third party, and banning participation in any international action 
along the lines of an economic or financial boycott of the other party."^^^
The Soviet policy of using one power against another was not conGned to 
European affairs. In the early twenties, according to Kulski, "Soviet Russia skilfully 
made use of the antagonisms between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Kuomintang 
China on the one hand and the Western Powers, notably Great Britain, on the other by 
giving support to lesser capitalist states against the great Powers.”^^ *
The second key tactic of Soviet balance of power diplomacy in the 1920s was the 
“neutralization” of Russia’s immediate neighbours so they could not serve as bases for a 
new intervention. The real success for this Soviet policy of “erecting around the USSR an 
anti-aggression barrier of international treaties, promises, and understandings”^^  ^came in 
1929, when Russia invited the border states to Moscow to sign the “Litvinov Protocol” -  
essentially a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression. This Protocol, which effectively 
obligated all Russia’s neighbour states from Estonia to Persia to a policy of non- 
aggression, was a "decisive link in the long chain of the Soviet Government’s efforts 
toward universal peace and especially peace in Eastern Europe.”^^
According to Triska, 'The policy of coexistence with the bourgeois world had 
become in the 1920s an established guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy, and only 
two important Western nations remained firmly hostile to the new Soviet Union -  the 
United States and France. The other Western nations had developed a working 
relationship with the Bolsheviks on the basis of bargaining and mutual expediency. The
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Bolsheviks bad broken tbrougb to a workable foreign pobcy and a viable pattern of 
international relationships."^'
The "temporary" failure of world revolution bad also brought about another 
development -  a sharp change of attitude toward the utility of revolutionary means of
foreign policy in comparison with balance-of-power politics. In other words, the aim of 
temporary coexistence with balance of power diplomacy as its means was accepted as the 
way to achieve the main goal, the preservation and strengthening of the Soviet state.
One of the most illustrative examples of this changing attitude is Soviet 
international behaviour during the war with Poland in 1920. The “Address to the Polish 
People,” issued by All-Russian Central Executive Committee in January 1920, explicitly 
stated that although Bolsheviks “still appear before the whole world as champions of 
communist ideals,” they “are not striving, and cannot strive, to plant communism by 
force in other countries."^^
During February 1920 Lenin, Trotsky, Joffe, Litvinov, Radek, and others, gave 
interviews to the foreign press on the “opportunities of peace and commercial relations 
between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world." Radek, for example, emphasized that 
Russia was “ready to conclude peace with every country which up to the present has 
fought against us," but in the future would be prepared to establish normal relations with 
Soviet Russia. He further emphasized that “if our capitalist partners abstain &om counter­
revolutionary activities in Russia, the Soviet Government wiH abstain 6om carrying on 
revolutionary activities in capitalist countries."^^
There was a considerable revival of revolutionary hopes when the defensive war 
conducted by the Soviets against Poland in 1920 was, for a brief time, transformed by the
78
military successes of the Red Army into a "revolutionary crusade." The Russians began 
to set up Soviets on Polish territory under the control of the Red Army and even 
established a Polish "Provisional Government" However, even at the height of the Red 
Army's campaign against Poland, the Soviet government continued negotiations with
Great Britain aiming to end USSR-UK hostilities and to establish normal diplomatic 
relations. These actions strongly suggest that, in early 1920s, the Soviet leadership "had
already begun to entertain serious doubts about the imminence of a worldwide 
revolutionary conflagration,"^^ and thus assigned a higher priority to the preservation of 
the Soviet state through balance of power diplomacy.
The confirmation of this argument can be clearly seen in Soviet behaviour with 
regard to events in Germany in 1923, when, despite the high hopes entertained by the 
Soviet leadership for the successful proletarian revolution in Germany, the Soviet 
government was willing to offer German communists only limited commitment. In other 
words, it was willing to provide volunteers and offer tactical guidance, but was not 
willing to start a full-scale war, which might jeopardize the security of the Soviet state 
itself.^ ^
In general, considerable evidence demonstrates the subordinate role of 
international communism in the Soviet view of the international situation. This evidence 
clearly shows a higher priority given in the 1920s by the Soviet leadership to the Soviet 
national interest and balance-of-power diplomacy in contrast with the primary focus on 
revolutionary objectives and tactics that was evident in the initial foreign policy 
behaviour of the Bolsheviks. In most cases the application of a balance of power policy 
conflicted with the revolutionary aspirations on the part of the Bolshevik government.
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Most of the regimes with which the Soviet Russia established, or tried to establish, 
Mendly relations were strongly anti-Communist, be they advanced capitalist states like 
Germany, or nationalist regimes such as Kemars regime in T u r k e y , o r  the Kuomintang 
regime in China.
Finally, the “temporary” failure of a world communist revolution produced a 
change within the hierarchy of the International Communist Movement itself. “The more
the issue of the world revolution receded, the more the Russian Communists took over 
the leadership of the Comintern, since they represented the only country in which there 
had been a successful r e v o l u t i o n .The Communist International became a centralized, 
highly disciplined organization under Russian leadership, which officially proclaimed 
“the cause of Soviet Russia as its own cause.” ®^^
“The failure of the world revolution,” Triska argues, “brought about the 
supremacy of Soviet communism and the Soviet comrades began increasingly to shape 
both the Comintern and communism in such a way that each would serve the new and 
only revolutionary country, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic."^
“Thus,” Ulam highlights, “from the position of 1917-1918 -  that Soviet Russia 
exists to promote the world revolution -  the Communist view by 1928 had shifted to the 
position that the world revolutionary movement exists to defend and promote the interests 
of the U SSR "^'
It also should be emphasized that, even as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, 
the record of the international Communist movement during 1920s was not impressive. 
As Ulam summarized it, “during this period, the Comintern sought in vain for a 
revolutionary opening in a Europe that had settled down.”^^ Thus, the extension of
80
Soviet power and influence during 1920s was more attributable to the achievements of 
Soviet diplomacy than to the Comintern's ef&rts.
After Lenin died in 1924, the Foreign Affairs Commissariat under Chicherin's
leadership was permitted to function with relative independence for some time due to the 
struggle for succession among Lenin’s leading colleagues. During this period the 
Commissariat carried on in the traditions and concepts of the Lenin era, which were
summarized in Lenin’s statement:
“So long, as we remain, from the economic and military 
standpoint, weaker than the capitalist world, so long we must stick to the 
rule; we must be clever enough to exploit conflicts and antagonisms 
among the imperialists, slowly accumulating strength and maintaining the 
oasis of Soviet power in the middle of a raging imperialist sea.”^^ ^
Part 2: Stalin’s Foreign Policy
By 1927, Stalin was able to secure a political victory over the opposition and 
emerged as the leader of the Soviet state. During his time, the general goals of Soviet 
foreign policy remained essentially the same, and Soviet foreign policy trends that 
originated with Lenin received further development.
First of all, as already emphasized, and contrary to the earlier belief of the 
impossibility of the coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist states for a long period 
of time, Soviet leaders eventually had come to realize that, in light of the contemporary 
situation, peaceful coexistence with capitalism was both possible and desirable. As Stalin 
said in 1925, “What we at one time regarded as a brief respite after the war has become a 
whole period of respite."^^ In other words, during the 1920s, the Soviet leadership's 
belief of the possibility of the short-time coexistence with capitalist states was replaced 
by the belief of the possibility of the extended coexistence between the Soviet state and
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the capitalist states. Furthermore, although the Soviet leaders still regarded war to be 
inevitable as long as capitalism existed, they came to think that, by the skilful use of 
balance of power diplomacy, they could avoid m ^or military conflicts: "If a war should 
come, it would be a war between rival imperialist camps."^^^
Stalin's position was influenced by two developments. First of all, the late 1920s 
witnessed the "temporary" stabilization of capitalism, with industrial output in some 
countries exceeding the prewar level.^  In addition, the revolutionary hopes of the Soviet 
leadership were further disappointed by the absence of any substantial progress there. By 
the end of the 1920s, Wesson notes, “foreign Communist parties were decadent; ten years 
after the founding of the Comintern, they had less than one tenth as many members as 
socialist parties. In many countries they were repressed or nonexistent. Practically 
nothing had been achieved through the colonial world to which Lenin had looked eagerly. 
The most promising venture, in China, had the most dismal outcome -  the complete 
destruction of the Chinese Communist movement.” Weaker attempts at United Fronts, in 
Poland and Britain, were equally unfruitful, and also harmful for Soviet diplomatic 
relations with these countries.^^^
In these circumstances, Stalin proposed the policy of “socialism in one country” 
as the only sensible course of Soviet policy. The essence of this policy was the building 
of a powerful "socialist" Russia instead of trying to bring about proletarian revolutions in 
other countries. Contrary to Trotsky, whose opinion reflected the earlier Bolsheviks' 
view that Russia's survival depended on the "world revolution," Stalin argued that 
socialism could and should first be built in Russia alone. A socialist Russia in turn would 
serve as the "base" for world revolution when that time arrived.^^^
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Stalin considered two factors to be essential to the advancement of Soviet power. 
The hrst o f these was the expansion of Russia's own industrial and military power. The 
second was the exploitation of differences between the great powers of the capitalist 
world, which became the essence of Stalin's statesmanship. In other words, Stalin's 
victory established an indisputable priority of Soviet national security over the interests 
of the international Communist movement. It also emphasized balance of power policy 
rather then revolutionary tactics for safeguarding the security of the Soviet state.
This point of view is clearly confirmed by examination of Soviet behaviour with 
regard to the major development of the interwar period -  the rise of Germany and Japan 
as expansionist states. The rise of aggressive militarism in Japan and of Nazism in 
Germany represented a serious double threat to the Soviet Union, a threat both from the 
East and from the West. The realization of the extent to which Soviet security was being 
undermined by these developments produced in the mid-1930s a Soviet policy aimed at 
creating an alliance with Western democracies, which appeared to be logical allies 
against fascism. The goal of this policy, according to Kennan, "was to strengthen the 
resistance of the western powers, particularly France and England, to Hitler, with a view 
either to frustrating his aggressive activities to such an extent as to cause him to lose 
prestige internally and to fall from power, or, if that could not be accomplished, to 
assuring that it would be the western powers, not Russia, who would bear the brunt of 
resulting military conflict."^^
This policy consisted of a dual effort: Grst, France and Britain had to be 
persuaded that it was they, not Russia, which were most endangered by fascist 
aggression; and, second, "these powers had to be tied to speciGc obligations of mutual
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military assistance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and other powers, which would assure that 
the weight of their influence and power would be fully enlisted as a restraint on Hitler's 
ambitions."^
The effort to implement this policy took several forms. One of them was the
entrance of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations in September 1934. Up to this 
time, the Soviet propagandists and statesmen consistently denounced the League as an
instrument of the forces of imperialism. But, in light of the Nazi and Japanese threat, the 
Soviets attempted to make the League function as a balance of power instrument, and 
thus become an obstacle to the ambitions of Germany and Japan.^ ®*
Another major move undertaken by Moscow to pursue alliance policies was an 
attempt to create an “Eastern Locarno” system that would provide immediate mutual 
assistance to any victim of aggression in Eastern Europe. As a supplement to the “Eastern 
Locarno” system, Moscow attempted to conclude a bilateral mutual assistance treaty with 
France. The Soviet leadership hoped that the demonstration of solidarity represented 
by the “Eastern Locarno” system would help to prevent a war from developing in the first 
place.^ ^
In case Soviet efforts to avoid military confrontation with Germany and Japan 
through balance of power diplomacy would prove unsuccessful, the third m^or Soviet 
move was the great rearmament program, which aimed at strengthening the Red Army 
and continued through the 1930s.^
Despite the scope of Soviet efforts to restrain European fascism, these efforts 
were unsuccessful. Several weaknesses, such as strong mutual distrust between the Soviet 
Union and Western democracies, ensured the League of Nations was completely
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ineffective in restraining fascist aggression. The language of a Franco-Soviet treaty of 
mutual assistance in case of aggression, signed on May 2, 1935, was ambiguous and 
complicated, and its operation was made dependent on prior action by the League of 
Nations. In addition, the French government's hesitation and delays with its ratiûcation
reduced this treaty’s value as a political demonstration to almost negligible proportions.
The reoccupation of the Rhineland by the Germans in 1936 clearly showed how 
insignificant this treaty was in German eyes. The failure of the Western powers to react to
this German move with any strong measures also demonstrated how ineffective the Pact 
was for Moscow’s purposes.^^^
At this point the Soviet leadership began to suspect that the Western democracies 
were not really interested in peace and security, and were trying to divert Germany and 
Japan against the USSR. The Munich Conference (September 29, 1938) is considered by 
most scholars as a key point in the collapse of the anti-Axis coalition.^^^ At this 
conference, the French and British leaders attempted to “appease” Hitler by yielding to 
his demands with regard to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets, moreover, were not invited to 
this conference.
The Munich Conference forced the Soviet leaders to abandon any remaining 
illusions about using Western democracies to balance the power of Germany and its 
allies. Their earlier suspicions were now extended to the conviction that Britain and 
France had left Hitler a free hand against Russia. Stalin, at the Eighteenth Party Congress 
in March 1939, in his explanation of the Anglo-French retreat before the military bloc of 
Germany, Italy and Japan, placed the main emphasis upon what he saw as a conspiracy to 
encourage German and Japanese aggression against the USSR.^^^
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Thus, ''the end of 1938 found Russia isolated in both the West and the East. The 
Red Army could not stop a combined attack by Germany and Japan. Some diplomatic 
arrangement was needed to turn the potential aggressors against the West, or at least 
delay any attack."^^ In these circumstances, Stalin decided that the goal of Soviet non­
involvement in the coming war could best be achieved by a "deal" with Hitler.
These considerations resulted in the famous Non-Aggression Pact, signed by 
Russia and Germany on August 23, 1939. The treaty was intended to secure Russia from 
a German attack and at the same time save the Soviet Union from the involvement in a 
general European war to serve Anglo-French interests. As the result of this treaty, the 
Japanese pressure on the eastern border of the USSR was substantially redueed.^*^ In 
addition, the Soviets received an opportunity for territorial adjustments in the West.^'° By 
concluding this treaty, Russia also obtained time to increase its military strength. Many 
scholars agree that, in light of the information available at that time, the conclusion of the 
pact by the Soviets was a very rational action in terms of contemporary power polities.^
It is also worth noting that, at the time of signing the agreement, the Soviet 
government “took special pains not to burn all its bridges with the West,”^^  ^ which 
proved to be wise in the course of events that followed. The Nazi attack on the Soviet 
Union on June 22, 1941, automatically made the Soviet Union the ally of the Western 
democracies, which were in war with Germany j&om 1939. However, the Soviet-Western 
suspicions were only temporarily eased by wartime alliance. The post-World War 11 
pursuit of strategic influence on both sides, dictated by mutual distrust, increased the 
hostility between the West and the USSR, and the alliance proved to be short-lived.^
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In the anti-Axis coalition, the Soviets pursued the same policy that they had 
followed in previous years. The essence of this policy was to stay on guard in regard to 
both enemies and allies, and try to create a means of protection 6om both. Throughout 
the war, Moore emphasizes, "Soviet policy was directed not only toward a military 
victory, but also toward emerging from the conflict in as strong a position as possible in 
relation to both allies and current enemies.
During World War II, Stalin’s policy -  the acquisition of territory and the 
expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence -  was largely successful.^*^ From the end of 
World War 11 to the end of Stalin’s rule in 1953, Soviet foreign policy continued to 
follow a similar course -  to maintain and, if possible, expand the Soviet sphere of 
influence.^’  ^As a result of the course of Soviet foreign policy pursued during the World 
War II and in the post-World War II period, Stalin “was able not only to regain most of 
the former empire of Tsarist Russia, but to extend Russia’s influence into areas never 
before under Russian domination.”^ I n  words of Litvinov, “There has been a return in 
Russia to the outmoded concept of security in terms of territory -  the more you’ve got, 
the safer you are.”^‘*
It could be seen from this brief review that, in the words of Soimenfeldt, 
“Stalin’s victory established an enduring conception of security that in its fundamental 
elements was essentially traditional. The Soviet Union was a state which had to stand on 
guard over its frontiers and territorial integrity. To do so, it needed military forces to 
deter or ward off potential invaders; it could utilize, and to some extent rely upon, the 
admittedly fragile but still not insignif cant protection of the 'bourgeois’ international 
order and its legal norms; it could seek alliances or other forms of association, including
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economic ones, with other members of the traditional state system; and it could and 
would try to manipulate the external balance of power.
It was already shown that the balance of power policies of the Soviet state were 
for the most part in conflict with its policy aimed at promoting world revolution. It was 
also emphasized that, starting with Brest-Litovsk, the goal of Soviet national security was 
given a much higher priority by the Soviet leadership than the goal of promoting world 
revolution. There is much evidence that, during Stalin’s era, the conflict in Soviet 
decision-making between pursuing Soviet national interests and pursuing world 
revolution resulted in an almost unconditional victory for the goal of Soviet national 
interests.
First of all, after Hitler came to power, Stalin repeatedly assured Germans that 
even the policy aimed at the extermination of the German communist movement pursued 
by Hitler and his government at that time did not represent an obstacle to the 
development of good relations between the USSR and Nazi G e r m a n y . T h e  German 
and the Soviet governments extended the Treaty of Berlin in May 1933, and thus, 
officially at least, both counties continued to pursue relations in the spirit of the Rapallo
' i 2 \agreement.
Then, at the end of 1933, Soviet foreign policy starts a new course -  to seek 
alliance with Western democracies against fascism. Litvinov outlined the essence of this 
new phase in Soviet foreign policy in his statement to the Central Executive Committee 
of the Supreme Soviet on December 29, 1933. After his speech, "his listeners and the 
whole country," according to Ulam, "were to be left under no misapprehension that any
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considerations of Communist solidarity, any traditional phrases and formulas, would stop 
the Soviet government 6"om seeking peace and security for Russia.
Moreover, since it was perceived by the Soviet leadership that an alliance with the 
Western democracies required "emphasizing Soviet similarities to the West and de­
emphasizing the diGerences," the Soviet Union at that time sought to acquire a "new 
image," which would indicate a "sharp break with its revolutionary past and a sense of 
identity with the Western democracies."^^ As a consequence, the Soviet revolutionary 
foreign policy was abandoned altogether.^^
This shift in Soviet policy can be clearly seen in Soviet behaviour with regard to 
Spanish civil war. First of all, contrary to the charges of contemporary^ European 
conservatives,the  Soviet intervention in the Spanish situation was not motivated by a 
desire to promote communism wherever possible, but was based on balance-of-power 
considerations. As Kennan evaluated the situation, “The immediate and energetic 
intervention of Germany and Italy on behalf of General Franco meant that, if Russia 
failed to intervene on behalf of the Spanish-Republican government, an early and 
dramatic victory of the insurgents could hardly be avoided. Such a victory would have 
meant the encirclement of France by the fascists, the probable triumph of fascist 
tendencies within France itself^ and the further weakening of western resistance to Hitler. 
The way would then be clear for a German aggression toward the East."^^^
Secondly, even while supporting the Spanish Republicans, Stalin was determined 
to demonstrate to the Western democracies that Russia was no longer pursuing the world 
revolution, and therefore could be a dependable ally. Although the situation in Spain 
clearly had very promising revolutionary opportunities, Stalin prohibited the Spanish
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Communist Party &om taking governmental power. Moreover, Russian and Spanish 
communists strongly resisted attempts of Spanish anarchists and socialists, whose 
behaviour pursued a much more Leninist pattern, to turn the government left. The 
communist slogan declared: "This is not a revolution at all; it is only the defence of the 
legal govemment."^^^ As Wesson emphasized, "faithful to the United Front ideal of 
putting defence ahead of social aims," the Spanish communist party under Soviet orders 
"actually became the right wing element of the governing coalition.
Moreover, when it became clear to the Soviet leadership that the Soviet policy 
toward Spain would not bring any benefits to the USSR in terms of strengthening the 
anti-Hitler coalition, but might actually result in direct Soviet involvement in full-scale 
war with Germany and Italy, the USSR halted its aid to Spain and “left Spanish leftism to 
its agonies."^^^
Finally, the Comintern itself was dissolved on May 22, 1943 when Stalin 
considered that its existence could jeopardize the goals the Soviet government was trying 
to achieve through traditional diplomacy.^^®
The evidence that shows the priority of balance of power diplomacy over 
revolutionary considerations in Soviet foreign policy during Stalin's era is virtually 
endless: an alliance with Germany in 1939, when Moscow stated that it had "always had 
full understanding for the Hitler's domestic opposition to Communism;"^^^ dismissal of 
communist internationalism -  proclaiming democracy instead of proletarian dictatorship 
as the goal of the world communist movement and the final dissolution of the Comintern 
- by the Soviets during World War H, since ideological differences could destroy an 
alliance between the USSR and West;^^  ^ the post-World War II Soviet policy aimed at
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increasing the sphere of Soviet influence and control, pursued "with no regard for 
'revolutionary' conditions or the interests and concerns of indigenous Communist 
parties. The priority of national interest considerations over revolutionary 
considerations in Soviet foreign policy thinking during Stalin's era is thus indisputable.
With the replacement of revolutionary considerations by national interest 
considerations as the main elements of Soviet foreign policy objectives, and 
revolutionary tactics by balance of power diplomacy as the main elements of Soviet 
foreign policy conduct, the role of world revolution in Soviet foreign policy became 
increasingly to supplement Soviet balance of power diplomacy. A brief review of the 
relationship between the international Communist movement and Soviet foreign policy 
during Stalin’s era will help to demonstrate this point.
As described earlier, the world Communist movement was, prior to 1930, 
transformed into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy aimed at promoting the interests 
of the USSR instead of world revolution.
By 1930, this transformation was complete. The foreign Communist parties 
became "slavishly subjugated" to the Soviet Communist Party and its leader. Marxism- 
Leninism became subordinated to the Soviet national interest, and internationalism was 
replaced by loyalty to the Soviet state and to Stalin. The only essential quality for the 
leaders of foreign communist parties became loyalty in execution of Moscow's policies. 
In short, Ulam summarizes, "by 1930, if one wanted to remain a Communist, one had to 
be a Stalinist.
As an obedient instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the Comintern in 1930s 
pursued the course of policy dictated to it from Moscow. The following several examples
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will help to demonstrate that, during Stalin's rule, it was used not to promote world 
revolution but to help the Soviet Union in achieving objectives based on balance of 
power considerations.
Initially, when the rise of National Socialism in Germany was considered by the 
Soviet leadership to be a desirable phenomenon, German communists pursued, under 
Moscow's orders, a course of policy that greatly aided Hitler's success.^^^
When Hitler’s regime was considered a threat to the Soviet Union’s security, 
Moscow sought to create an alliance with Western democracies. At the same time the 
Comintern proclaimed a new policy in which all capitalist states, instead of being 
presumed imperialist, were divided into the “aggressive” and “peace loving.” Communist 
parties, Moscow ordered, “should cherish bourgeois democracy until it could be replaced 
by proletarian d e m o c r a c y . A s  a result of this new policy, communists in western 
democracies were ordered by the Comintern to assist liberal and even conservative 
groups in the fight against fascism. Until this time. Communist deputies in the French 
parliament, for example, opposed all defence measures of the “capitalist warmongers;” 
after Stalin’s new instructions, the French communists began to support their 
government's defence policy
But then, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed. According to the 
new line for the Comintern, formulated by Moscow, Hitler once again became a friend, 
and democracies once again became responsible for the “imperialist war.'' At that time, 
Rosser emphasizes, “it became obvious to all but the most thoroughly conditioned party 
Mthful that fareign communists were merely tools of the Soviet state.''^^^
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Thus, Soviet foreign policy 6om the establishment of Soviet state through the 
Leninist and Stalinist eras of Soviet foreign policy evolved from being based exclusively 
on pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine to being determined by considerations 
"quite similar to those that had traditionally assured the physical survival of nation-states
in times of peril.”^^  ^As Sonnenfeldt summarizes, by the end of Stalin’s era, the Soviet 
Union had become a state "concerned with its territorial integrity and physical security; it 
sought to extend its frontiers as far as possible against the incursions of the potential 
enemy; it sought allies, regardless of political orientation; it tried to buy time when 
necessary with economic and other concessions; and it set aside revolutionary goals 
abroad both because they disrupted the traditional diplomatic efforts aimed for survival of 
the Soviet state, and because, if pursued, they might even have heightened the threat.
Part 3: Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy -  The Final Stage of Evolution
The final stage of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy occurred under 
Khrushchev, who consolidated his power in 1957. The evolution was influenced by two 
factors. First of all, the Soviet position within the international system of states had 
greatly improved. Despite its difficult beginning, the Soviet Union had become one of the 
two world’s greatest powers. This transformation of a weak revolutionary state into a 
powerful national state substantially reduced Soviet revolutionary enthusiasm. As shown 
in the pages above, Soviet concepts originally based on pre-revolutionary Marxist- 
Leninist thought were substantially revised during the evolution of Soviet policy. The 
most crucial change occurred when, contrary to earlier beliefs, the success of the world 
socialist revolution was declared to be dependent on the security of the Soviet state. This 
revision led to fundamental changes in other ideological concepts. The value of allies
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became judged not on the basis of faith to Communist ideological principles, but on the 
basis of their possible contribution to the national interest of the Soviet state. "War" 
changed from a positive phenomena that encouraged progressive soeial change to a 
negative phenomena that jeopardised the success of world revolution by endangering its
stronghold -  the Soviet state. Consequently, “peace” also shifted from a negative 
phenomena that benefits the exploiting classes to a positive phenomena that enables the
proletarian revolution represented by the Soviet state to preserve and further develop its 
achievements.
In short, by the 1950s, the Soviet Union had become a powerful nation, playing a 
very important part in a world balance of power. The realization by the Soviet leadership 
of the enormous efforts invested by the USSR, of “what it had achieved in contrast to 
what it may achieve,” made them “even more reluctant than before to take any major 
risks that could endanger its position in the world.” '^^ ’ From the revolutionary state 
existing to promote the world revolution, the Soviet Union had evolved to a 
“bureaucratized state administering a complex economy and interested in order and 
stability
The second factor was the development of nuclear weapons. The Soviet attitude 
toward relations with capitalist countries changed significantly as the Soviet political elite 
began to realize the implications of nuclear weapons. As Khrushchev said in 1957, "War 
will be, under contemporary conditions, an atomic war with all its conséquences."^'*" 
Realizing that the Soviet Union could not easily recover from the disaster of a nuclear 
war, the Soviet leadership realized that the use of war, under these conditions, could be 
justiÊed only on the grounds of a direct threat to national survival. Therefore, "the Soviet
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leaders could no longer believe that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed 
because that meant that to all intents and purposes socialism was doomed. The two 
theories of the inevitability of war and the ultimate triumph of socialism were 
incompatible and, not surprisingly, the first of these theories was retired .''^
This re-examination of the Soviet relationship with the noncommunist world 
found its reflection in Khrushchev's Central Committee Report to the Twentieth Party 
Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. In this report, Khrushchev reformulated 
concepts of the world devised by Lenin and adhered to by Stalin. He described the 
contemporary situation not in terms of two camps -  socialist and capitalist, but in terms 
of three camps. The “colonial and semicolonial” areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
were declared a separate camp instead of being a part of the capitalist camp. In the same 
report, Khrushchev reinterpreted Lenin’s view on war. He concluded that at present time 
the war between the imperialist and socialist systems was not “fatally inevitable” and 
could and should be avoided. '^^^
This 1956 report revealed premises of Soviet foreign policy toward 
noncommunist countries that were to define Soviet foreign behaviour from that moment 
onward. These premises became the basis on which the new theory of “peaceful 
coexistence of differing social systems” was constructed. The term “peaceful 
coexistence” itself was “extracted 6om its historical context and original connotation as 
an expedient tactic for survival in adversity and raised to the stature of a strategy of 
indefinite duration.”^  The theory of “competitive coexistence” was also constructed on 
these premises. The essence of this theory was the replacement of military by political 
and economic instruments as the main means of achieving Soviet foreign policy goals.
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upon these premises was also built the theory of the "isolation of world capitalism 
through recruitment of the third world of colonial, semicolonial, and former colonial 
peoples into the ranks of world socialism.
As a result of the USSR becoming a great power and of the development of 
nuclear weapons, Soviet policy-makers found it dangerous to rely on military means to 
advance national goals. Thus, the primary tools for conducting that struggle became 
economic, political, and ideological in nature. Let us briefly examine these tools, which 
assumed an important role in Soviet foreign policy conduct, starting with the economic 
policy of the USSR.
One example of economic methods of achieving Soviet foreign policy objectives 
is the Soviet foreign aid program that began in 1954-55. This program was designed to 
assist new states in three principal ways. It granted credits on favourable terms; it 
provided them with extensive scientific and technical assistance; and, finally, it 
established trade relations between the USSR and the developing countries “on a 
mutually advantageous basis.” '^^ * It is necessary to emphasize that, despite all Soviet 
ideological pronouncements, the Soviet foreign aid program was primarily a response to 
the American program, and its basic motive was to minimize Western influence in areas 
of strategic concern to the USSR^'*^
In light of the diminished importance of military means, the Khrushchev era also 
witnessed the development of traditional diplomacy as the best method of achieving the 
direct objective of Soviet foreign policy: the strengthening of the position of the USSR 
vis-à-vis the leading countries in the West. Despite the continuing Soviet 
pronouncements that Soviet diplomacy constituted the “new type of international
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relations," firmly based on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism,^^'^ a lot of evidence 
suggests that, in 1950s, it could be considered 'hiew" only "to the extent that the use of 
the regular diplomatic corps for espionage and subversive purposes found its 
rationalization and justiGcation in the ideology of international class struggle."^^' 
Furthermore, considering that even Soviet sources defined the main task of Soviet foreign 
policy in 1950s-1960s as the establishment o f "normal diplomatic relations with the 
capitalist states” and “peaceful settlement of all questions in dispute on a realistic 
b a s i s , i t  is evident that, since its first development by early Bolsheviks, the Soviet 
concept of diplomacy was fundamentally revised to adjust to new conditions. As a result 
of this adjustment, Marxist-Leninist principles, such as proletarian internationalism, 
occupied a subordinate position to the national policy objectives of the USSR in Soviet 
foreign policy-making.^^^
The final ingredient of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War has been the 
ideological component. In the 1950s, in the context of “peaceful coexistence,” the 
manipulation of political forces in areas outside the Soviet sphere of influence could 
bring substantial benefits to the Soviets. For that purpose, the Soviet leadership 
developed a complex "propaganda apparatus" which was assigned the task of conducting 
the ideological struggle around the world. This apparatus included foreign communist 
parties, the government ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture, and Foreign Trade and all 
committees and programs related to them. Radio Moscow, numerous newspapers and 
periodicals, and other organizations. It is necessary to emphasize here that this 
ideological instrument of Soviet foreign policy was created and used not to benefit world 
Communism in general but to "propagate Soviet Communist doctrine and to persuade
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others to support Soviet policies and Soviet-sponsored organizations"^^ - in other words, 
as a supplement to traditional diplomacy in achieving goals dictated by the national 
interest of the USSR.
It is also necessary to note that, despite its significantly diminished role,^^  ^ the 
military still remained a necessary instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Despite the 
growing emphasis on other foreign policy means, the Soviet leadership continued to keep 
this instrument "in constant readiness," maintaining the world's largest armed forces, and 
allocating from 10 to 25 percent of GNP to military related industries.^^^
The examination of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev 
era presented in this work is very brief. However, in my opinion, it successfully performs 
its tasks - to highlight major changes in the Soviet leadership’s perceptions during the 
Khrushchev era, and to demonstrate that these changes served to reinforce rather than 
diminish specific trends in Soviet foreign policy that originated with Brest-Litovsk and 
have remained permanent characteristics of Soviet foreign policy ever since. The very 
limited space allowed for this work does not permit the continuation of this discussion, 
and the literature available on Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev period and 
afterwards is large. Most scholars agree that the changes outlined above were major 
changes in the perceptions of Soviet leaders and had a significant effect on the course of 
Soviet foreign policy, and after that time there were no significant changes either in the 
perceptions of Soviet leaders or in the course of foreign policy pursued by the Soviet 
government. In other words, there is a consensus among scholars that the transformation 
of Soviet foreign policy during Khrushchev period outlined in this work was the final 
stage of Soviet foreign policy evolution.
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In conclusion, the evidence shows that during the Khrushchev era and afterwards 
"Soviet foreign policy showed remarkable persistence and continuity in its tactically 
versatile pursuit of the key objectives," which were 'h ) sow and exploit discord between 
the countries of Western Europe and the United States and among NATO members; to 
foster its security, which [the Soviet leadership] believed lay in a weakened West and 
retention of a 6vourable balance of power; and to increase the political, economic and 
military leverage that it could bring to bear on concrete issues.”^^ *
Part 4: Summary
This chapter examined three phases of development of Soviet foreign policy: the 
period of Leninist foreign policy from Brest-Litovsk until Stalin’s consolidation of 
power; the period of Stalin’s foreign policy, and Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin 
period. While this has been a broad and brief survey, the evidence presented in this 
chapter suggests that certain trends that emerged in Soviet foreign policy during the 
negotiations of Brest-Litovsk were further developed in the course of Soviet history.
As already emphasized, the most profound shift in Soviet foreign policy at the 
time of Brest-Litovsk was the replacement of revolutionary considerations by national 
interest considerations as the m^or determinant of Soviet foreign policy objectives. After 
Brest-Litovsk, the main objective of Soviet foreign pohcy was "to maintain or expand the 
national power of the Soviet state."^^^
The other trends that emerged in Soviet foreign pohcy starting with Brest-Litovsk 
were an increasing preference toward the use of balance of power diplomacy and an 
increasing subordination of revolutionary tactics to traditional diplomacy. It is clear ft-om
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the preceding review that, far from being temporary, these aspects became permanent 
characteristics of Soviet foreign policy.
In sum, starting with Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet Union became increasingly 
socialized to the international system. This course of Soviet foreign policy development 
substantially narrowed the differences between Soviet foreign policy and the foreign 
policies of other states both in goals and in strategies chosen for their achievement.
The final chapter will summarize the structural influences of the international 
system in imposing certain standards of behaviour upon Soviet state.
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Chapter V: CONCLUSION
From the evidence examined in this work it is clear that the structure of 
international system had a m ^or influence on Soviet leaders' perceptions and Soviet
foreign policy behaviour.
On the moment of coming to power, the perceptions of Soviet leaders were
shaped by pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which viewed both the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie as movements international in character and not attached to any 
particular country. Thus, in its emphasis of the class struggle between the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie, pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine did not attach significance to 
any particular state and rejected national sentiments in favour of proletarian 
internationalism.
These perceptions served as the basis for the “unorthodox” foreign policy 
behaviour of the Soviet state in the early stage of its existence, such as direct appeals of 
Bolshevik leaders to the working masses abroad instead of negotiating with foreign 
governments in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives.
However, these Bolshevik perceptions of the international situation were soon 
compelled to change under the influence of the structure of the international system. As a 
result of the Bolshevik revolution, proletarians had acquired a country. During the Brest- 
Litovsk negotiations the Bolsheviks became increasingly aware of the low revolutionary 
potential in the rest of the world.^^ In this situation, as Lenin put it, "the most important 
thing, both for us and &om the point of view of international socialism,” became "the 
preservation of Soviet Russia.” This view is also clearly seen in Stalin's later statement, 
"An internationalist is he, who unreservedly and without hesitation and without
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conditions is prepared to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world 
revolutionary movement, and to defend and to advance this movement without defending 
the USSR is impossible."^'^^
Thus, Soviet leaders came to regard the goal of eventual triumph of the world 
communism as dependent on survival and national power of the Soviet state. They also, 
as emphasized in Chapter III, came to view the rest of the world in terms of states as 
major actors. It is, in my opinion, correct to say that the structure of the international 
system imposed its state-centric character on Soviet perceptions.
This change in the character of Soviet perceptions helps to explain a fundamental 
contradiction between the real course of Soviet foreign policy aimed at the increase of 
Soviet national power and Marxist-Leninist principles of class struggle and proletarian 
internationalism on which it was supposed to be based.^^^ As noted by several Soviet 
foreign policy scholars, “while the Soviets were creating the theoretical underpinnings of 
a policy aimed at support for ‘progressive-revolutionary’ regimes, the concrete aspects of 
Soviet foreign policy were moving in a different d i r e c t i o n . The major factors that 
have increasingly influenced Soviet interest in and policy toward an individual country 
have been this country’s actual or potential strategic importance for the Soviet Union and 
the possibility of disrupting influence patterns of the opponents of the Soviet Union in a 
particular region.^
As I stated earlier, as a result of change in Soviet perceptions imposed by the 
structure of the international system, the Soviet leaders came to view the international 
system in terms of states as m^or actors, and chose to pursue the goal of the world 
socialist victory through the maximization of power of the Soviet state. From this
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perspective the friendly regime of a state, even an anti-communist one, was considered a 
much more influential political actor than any local movement, even communist. Thus, 
the character of a Mendly regime did not make a signiScant difference as long as this 
regime constituted a useful ally of the USSR in the world power struggle.
The evidence also suggests a profound impact of the structural constraints of the 
international system on Soviet international behaviour. It was shown in Chapter III that, 
as early as at the time of Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Soviet leaders realized that a 
revolutionary foreign policy was not likely to bring them any substantial benefits in terms 
of the Soviet national interest, but could further aggravate an already desperate situation. 
In that situation they had no choice but to reject revolutionary tactics in favour of the 
time-proven balance of power diplomacy which helped other states to survive in the 
international system. The evidence presented in Chapter IV confirmed that, far from 
being temporary, this behavioural change became a permanent characteristic of Soviet 
foreign policy. It is thus possible to conclude that the structure of international system 
imposed its standard of behaviour on the Soviet state.
It is necessary to emphasize that the changes in Soviet perceptions and behaviour 
outlined above did not mean that Marxist-Leninist ideology ceased to be a prime 
motivating force of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, Soviet foreign policy-making during 
and after the Brest-Litovsk could be summarized as the continuous effort by the Soviet 
leaders to "reach pragmatic solutions" to arising problems "within the general framework 
of the Marxist-Leninist ideology."^^^
In other words, ideology continued to define the long-range goal of Soviet foreign 
policy - the triumph of world communism.^^ However, pragmatic considerations helped
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to find the most effective strategy for the achievement of this goal within the context of 
"external circumstances which the Soviet leaders did not control and over which they had 
only limited influence."^^^ In short, pragmatic considerations dictated that, given the 
existing set of circumstances, the achievement of the long-range goal of world
communism could be best ensured through the achievement of the medium-range goal of 
the USSR's security by improving its position in the international system of states.
Thus, the course of policy chosen by the Soviet leaders starting with Brest- 
Litovsk was the best option for the achievement of the goals prescribed by Communist 
ideology. Ideology combined with pragmatism “dictated that the prime goal of Soviet 
foreign policy was survival of the Soviet state, not the pursuit of world revolution or any 
such ideological ‘will-o’-the-wisps.’”^^ * In general, this “mixture of ideology and 
practical considerations”^^ produced the shift from revolutionary tactics to balance of 
power diplomacy in Soviet foreign policy.
The evidence examined in this work described the process of adjustment of 
ideologically predetermined Soviet perceptions and international behaviour to the 
realities of the existing structure of the international system of states, which the USSR 
was unable to overthrow and replace with a new socialist system. It was shown that, as 
the result of this ac^ustment, Soviet perceptions (and consequently Soviet international 
behaviour) changed in a way consistent with the Realist perspective on international 
relations. Thus, despite the ideological pronouncements of Soviet leaders, I argue that 
major Soviet foreign pohcy decisions starting with the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty were in 
fact reactions to changes in the international balance of power; in other words, "the
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pragmatism of 'Realpolitik' was dominant even if it was coyly draped in a red banner of 
Marxist internationalism."^^"
If balance of power considerations served as a basis far m ^or Soviet foreign 
policy decisions starting with Brest-Litovsk, then it is clear that "the importance of
ideology in guiding Soviet foreign policy has never been so great as would appear from 
die contention that its practitioners believe in and follow it."^^  ^Nevertheless, throughout
the course of the USSR’s existence, foreign policy decisions made by the Soviet 
leadership were constantly expressed and justified in ideological terms.
In my opinion, the continuing reliance of the Soviet leadership on Communist 
ideology in the formulation and justification of Soviet foreign policy can be explained by 
various factors.
As noted in Chapter I, ideology has a high potential for mass mobilization, 
manipulation and control. Marxist tradition is particularly strong in that respect. Marx in 
his work “German Ideology” treated ideology as the means by which the ruling class 
defended its interests and maintained the capitalist system through manipulation of social 
consciousness.^^^ Lenin in his work “What is to be done?" saw socialist ideology as a 
weapon of class struggle, fighting against bourgeois ideology and defending the interests 
of proletariat. Arguing that the working class must combat the bourgeoisie on all 6onts of 
the struggle, Lenin emphasized that of these fronts the theoretical was at least equally 
important. He argued that Engels recognized “not two forms of the great struggle of 
Social-Democracy (political and economic), as the common opinion states, but three, 
placing the theoretical struggle on a par with the first two."^^^
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An illustrative example of the Marxist-Leninist view of ideology is Lenin's 
doctrine of "induced proletariat consciousness." Lenin insisted that, while the socialist 
consciousness of the working class is "the only basis that can guarantee our victory," it is 
the task of the party "to imbue the proletariat with the consciousness of its position and
the consciousness of its task.” This doctrine of vanguard control over the proletarian 
movement by a select, highly disciplined group of professional revolutionaries, Carlsnaes 
highlights, “in effect amounted to the ‘political expropriation of the proletariat’ by a 
small group of the bourgeois, revolutionary intelligentsia of Russia.” ’^"^
Ideology thus helped to maintain internal control. The Soviet regime needed 
ideology to maintain its authority and the stability of the Soviet political system. 
According to Mayer, "Ideology functions as the legitimation device. It is to convince the 
citizenry that the Party and its leaders have a legitimate claim to rule them. More broadly, 
it is to convince the people that the entire system of government is legitimate.”^^ ^
In the “doctrine of the induced proletarian consciousness” Lenin suggests the 
masses are much more apt to support policies of a particular regime if they fall under the 
influence of its ideology first. And since this strategy worked in Russia in 1917, the 
logical step for the Bolsheviks was to try ideological subversion against external enemies, 
especially because they lacked any other means at the time. The fact that the Bolsheviks 
realized after the revolution that they overestimated its external potential does not 
override the fact that ideology proved to be to a certain degree an effective tool of 
influence on foreign public opinion and thus helped Bolsheviks to ensure the survival of 
their state. As Rubinstein emphasized, "The stress on fomenting world revolution
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developed out of initial military weakness and, having proved its effectiveness as a 
weapon, has remained an integral part of the Soviet diplomatic arsenal/'^^^
Therefore, I argue that the main reason for the continuous employment of 
Communist ideology as a justification of foreign policy decisions by the Soviet leaders 
was to gain both domestic and international support for the course of foreign policy 
pursued by the Soviet govemment/^^
The summary of the argument is shown in Figure 2. First of all, Figure 2 shows 
different components of Soviet foreign policy: the “objective” (which for the purpose of 
this work is divided into “long-range goals” and “short-range goals”), the “strategy” for 
its achievement, and the “justification” of the course of policy chosen by Soviet leaders. 
It also highlights two major factors of influence on Soviet foreign policy: Marxist- 
Leninist ideology and the structure of international system of states. The figure shows 
that, as a result of constraints imposed by the structure of international system, only two 
aspects of Soviet foreign policy remained under the dominant influence of Communist 
ideology -  the long-range goal of Soviet foreign policy and the justification for the course 
of policy conducted by the Soviet government. The other components of Soviet foreign 
policy — its short-range goals and the strategy chosen for their achievement -  became 
determined by structural influences of the international system of states.
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Figure 2.
The Outline of Ideological and Structural Influence on Different Aspects of the 
Soviet Foreign Policy Process:
Marxist-
Leninist
ideology
Structure of the 
international 
system of states
The long-range 
goal: the world 
revolution
Rationalization 
and justification of 
policy decisions
The strategy: 
pursuit of balance 
of power policies
Medium and short- 
range goals: 
increase in Soviet 
national power
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Thus, as a result of the constraints imposed by the structure of international 
system, the impact of Communist ideology on the course of Soviet foreign policy was
limited. This view of the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy is supported by 
numerous scholars.^^^
As emphasized in the discussion of Realism in Chapter 2, in the anarchical 
international system attempts of one state to improve its position by increasing its power 
are always accompanied by efforts of other states to match this power increase. It is thus 
by definition impossible for the state to feel completely secure in the anarchical system of 
states. Thus, the preservation of the Soviet state and increase of Soviet national power 
became a strategy of indefinite duration. In other words, it is clear that the concentration 
of Soviet leaders on short-range goals and adjustment to the structure of the international 
system had, as Moore put it, “caused the means to eat up the ends.”^^ ^
This conclusion is widely supported by Soviet foreign policy scholars. Rostow, 
for example, characterized Soviet foreign policy as “a series of responses to the outside 
world which, especially before 1939, took the form of such actions as were judged most 
likely, on a short-range basis, to maintain or expand the national power of the Soviet 
regime." Despite the Soviet Union's substantially improved international position after 
WWII, Rostow says that “there is no evidence that the foreign policy criteria of the 
regime ... changed.
Rosser argues that the “long-range theoretical predictions and the utopian goals of 
ideology ... did not distort daily decisions in Soviet foreign policy," which were made on
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the basis of sober analysis of the international distribution of power/^' Wesson also says 
that '^ le  signiGcance of ideology was much greater for long-range expectations than for 
day-to-day operations, in which (although not in statements) Soviet diplomacy was often 
hardly distinguishable from traditional great-power politics. Marxism-Leninism claims to 
tell about the climate, not the weather.” Throughout Soviet history, he argues, “ideology 
seemed to carry little weight alongside ordinary considerations of balance of power. 
Especially illustrative here is Litvinov’s statement in justification of friendly relations 
with Hitler in 1933: “We as Marxists are the last who could be reproached with allowing 
sentiment to prevail over politics.” *^^
In short, I argue that, due to the anarchic nature of the international system, the 
ultimate goals of Communist ideology ceased to be “empirically operative”^^ in Soviet 
foreign policy determinations at the moment when Soviet leaders first defined the 
achievement of national security as the prerequisite to any other aims.
Another aspect of the relationship between Soviet official ideology and Soviet 
foreign policy deserves a separate consideration. As emphasized in previous pages, due to 
the structural constraints of the international system, Marxist-Leninist ideology ceased to 
be a m ^or determinant of Soviet foreign policy decisions. However, these decisions still 
had to be rationalized and justified in ideological terms. This caused, as shown in 
Chapters HI and IV, continuous efforts of Lenin and his successors to revise and amend 
Communist theory in order to make it conform to contemporary circumstances.^^^ The 
obvious examples of the modifications introduced to Communist doctrine under the 
influence of the structure of international system are “Peaceful Coexistence” and 
“Socialism in One Country”.
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Soviet ideology thus became a "creative, constantly developing doctrine, 
which "derived at least as much from the strategy as vice versa." As a result, the 
Soviet Communist theory became increasingly descriptive rather than prescriptive in the
course of Soviet history. As Marantz argues, “for Lenin [and his successors] it can truly 
be said that theory ‘did not determine the nature of action; action determined the meaning 
of theory.'"^^ In the process, the role of Marxism-Leninism shifted increasingly 6om 
being a guide for Soviet foreign policy to being a post-facto rationalization for policy 
decisions.
Let us recall some of the arguments presented in the discussion on ideology in 
Chapter 1, and Soviet ideology in particular in Chapter 3. Many scholars viewed Soviet 
ideology as the major determinant of Soviet foreign policy on the grounds that it shaped 
Soviet leaders’ perceptions of the international situation, determined goals of Soviet 
foreign policy and offered to Soviet leaders a concrete program of political action.
Let us also recall the structural Realist position, which states that, due to the 
constraints imposed by the structure of the international system, an increase in national 
power and a certain pattern of international behaviour is a necessary precondition for the 
implementation of any ideologically motivated goals. Therefore, Realists argue that that 
structure is the major determinant of a state’s foreign policy.
The evidence presented in this work demonstrated that, in the initial period of 
Soviet foreign policy, Marxist-Leninist ideology indeed served as the m ^or determinant 
of Soviet leaders’ perceptions, Soviet foreign policy goals and Soviet international 
behaviour. However, the evidence also highlighted the changes imposed on Soviet 
foreign policy by the structure of the international system. First of all, it was emphasized
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that, contrary to the Marxist perspective that viewed the world in terms of two opposing 
international movements, the Soviet perception of the international situation shifted to the 
state-centric point of view consistent with the Realist perspective. It was also emphasized 
that the Soviet national interest - survival and increase in power - was admitted by Soviet
leaders to be a necessary condition for the realization of the ultimate goal of world 
socialist victory. Finally, it was demonstrated that Soviet international behaviour shifted 
from revolutionary tactics to the common pattern of state behaviour described in the 
Realist theory of the balance of power.
In short, the evidence demonstrated that the structural influence of the 
international system not only substantially reduced the impact of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology on day-to-day Soviet foreign policy, but caused fundamental changes in the 
Communist doctrine itself. Therefore, I argue that, although Communist ideology 
undoubtedly played a motivational role in Soviet foreign policy, the limits imposed by 
the structure of the international system of states rendered the structural Realist 
perspective a much more effective tool for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy than the 
“ideological” perspective. In other words, regardless of the ideological inclinations of 
Soviet leaders, we can assume that Soviet statesmen thought and acted in terms of 
national interest defrned as power.^^ We can also assume that Soviet ideology was a tool 
for implementing Soviet foreign policy decisions more than a "blueprint providing 
explicit guidance to Soviet foreign policy.”^^ ^
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Epilogue
This work examined the relationship between Communist ideology and Soviet 
foreign policy. It has been shown that Marxism-Leninism served both as a motivation 
behind Soviet foreign policy and a tool of its implementation. However, this work has 
demonstrated that the influence of the structure of the international system of states was
the primary determinant of Soviet foreign policy conduct: even official Soviet sources 
admitted that, in the course of Soviet foreign policy, foreign policy decisions were 
worked out by the Soviet leadership on the basis of “a level-headed appraisal of the 
balance of strength in the world arena.
The record of Soviet international behaviour presented in this work indicates that 
Soviet leaders were forced to adjust to the general pattern of behaviour in the 
international system of states. This pattern of international behaviour was described in 
Chapter I in the discussion of the Realist perspective on international relations and finds 
its clearest reflection in the structural Realist theory of the balance of power. As stated by 
Moore, the essence of this theory is that one should oppose “the power that in growing 
stronger threatens one's own security," and in order to do so, "one should seek allies 
where they can be found, independently of cultural and ideological afGnities."^^^ Soviet 
foreign policy behaviour was consistent with these principles despite Soviet statements to 
the contrary. Considering the fundamental difference between this type of international 
behaviour and the type of international behaviour suggested by pre-revolutionary 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine, we can conclude that Moore is absolutely correct saying that 
"the structure of world politics imposes a certain form of behaviour on states that is 
independent of the social and economic structure of these states."^^
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Levi summarizes the argument:
"The system does not impose any ideology of its own on the 
policymaker; the system does, however, dictate a good deal of behaviour 
related to the pursuit of interests, regardless of ideology... Large or small, 
no state can altogether escape some of the influences of the system upon
its foreign policy-making because every state is to a larger or smaller 
degree affected by the behaviour of other states and must react, and react 
to some extent in a manner prescribed by the system. There is a certain 
automatism in the international system to which all states are subject in 
some way, and it has nothing to do with their ideologies.
With this statement, I would like to conclude this work.
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